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Abstract 
 
In the age of digital disruption, values, assets, business models, and processes are constantly 
challenged, new ones emerge, and others fade. Throughout this transition some markets and 
industries are experiencing a dramatic shift as their value propositions are inadequate to support 
the new business models. Life as we know it is changing, we are changing. In an hyperconnected 
world where everyone can potentially interact with anyone, it does make sense to talk about a 
digital information ecosystem. 
One of the emerging issues is the creation and spread of false information, involving various 
stakeholders and causing many discussions and research.  In this context we are studying the role 
of social media in the information disorder ecosystem, the initiatives that have been developed 
and the taxonomies of false information types in order to suggest our own typology.  
 
 
Androniki Christopoulou 
07/12/2018 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank my professor Mr. Vassilios Peristeras, for placing his trust on my 
abilities conducting this research and for his constant support and inspiration 
throughout my studies. It has been an amazing journey in the academic world and I 
have learned a lot hoping to provide even more. 
Nothing would be the same without the unconditional love and support of my family 
and friends, to whom I owe much more than they know. 
 
Androniki 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 2 
Chapter 1 Introduction -Background ............................................................................................... 5 
Chapter 2 Scope and Methodology ............................................................................................... 16 
2.1 Scope ................................................................................................................................... 16 
2.2 Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 17 
Chapter 3 Social media and initiatives mapping ........................................................................... 18 
3.1 The role of social media in the information disorder ecosystem ........................................ 18 
3.1.1 Moving from traditional news to social media-based news consumption .................. 18 
3.1.2 The rise and dynamics of social media as news channels ............................................ 19 
3.1.3 Social media – Innovative characteristics ..................................................................... 24 
3.1.4 The dangers of radical Personalization ........................................................................ 25 
3.1.5 The new online advertising model ............................................................................... 27 
3.2 Initiatives and practices developed to tackle information disorder ................................... 33 
3.3. Synthesis of the above principles and recommendations ................................................. 46 
Chapter 4 – A systematic literature review of the false information taxonomies:  Typology of 
disinformation ............................................................................................................................... 50 
4.1 Introduction - Background .................................................................................................. 50 
4.2. Systematic Literature Review   - Research method ............................................................ 51 
4.3 SLR Results ........................................................................................................................... 55 
4.4 Our approach  ...................................................................................................................... 61 
4.4.1 Part 1 – Creating a disinformation typology................................................................. 61 
4.4.2 Part 2 Combining categorization criteria with the typology ........................................ 67 
4.5 Summary and conclusions ................................................................................................... 70 
Citations ......................................................................................................................................... 72 
APPENDIX ...................................................................................................................................... 81 
Glossary ..................................................................................................................................... 81 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction -Background 
 
In the age of digital disruption, values, assets, business models, and processes are 
constantly challenged, new ones emerge, and others fade. Throughout this transition 
some markets and industries are experiencing a dramatic shift as their value propositions 
are inadequate to support the new business models. Life as we know it is changing, we 
are changing. In an hyperconnected world where everyone can potentially interact with 
anyone, following a many-to-many communication model, producing, disseminating and 
receiving huge amounts of data, it does make sense to talk about a digital information 
ecosystem. One of the domains dramatically affected by those changes, is the media 
system. Traditional media like press are in deep crisis whereas a very innovative and 
complex online information business model has been formed the last years.    
At the core of this digital transformation is the introduction of the innovative business 
model of online platforms contrary to the traditional linear model followed offline. The 
intrusion of social media platforms in our lives and the profound changes are undeniable. 
One impressive aspect of this new reality is the use of social media as information sources, 
something that has amplified this shift in the information ecosystem. The online platforms 
have been linked with the spread of political and social propaganda and the introduction 
of content monetization advertising models.  
One dimension of this new status is the spread of false information, polluting this fragile 
digital information ecosystem. As a result, anyone can produce false or low-quality 
content as an authoritative legitimate source, driven by malicious or other motives with 
potential harmful impact. This is not because humanity has recently discovered harmful 
intentions in information production. Propaganda, pseudoscience and other types of false 
information were always there. Spreading false or inaccurate information for political or 
other reasons is a phenomenon almost as old as human societies.  Internet is actually a 
mirror of society, people are creating and sharing online content guided by various 
motives. What is rather different now causing numerous discussions, is that everything 
happens in global scale, with unprecedent speed and with the use of leading-edge 
technology and compound business models. False information takes various forms and 
the rise in the use of social media and the related implications cannot be ignored in a 
discussion concerning information disorder. 
To begin with, it is necessary to start with definitions and the background. We are 
deliberately avoiding the ambiguous term “fake news” which has been extensively and 
almost abusively used in some cases to describe everything without considering unique 
aspects and characteristics, instead we favor the term false information. Fake is 
something that is “not genuine; imitation or counterfeit” whereas news mean “newly 
received or noteworthy information, especially about recent events.” But there are many 
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cases of false information where there might be some level of facticity or describing past 
events as present thus contradicting with the definitions of fake and news. All these 
details introduce unique attributes that should be carefully examined before deciding for 
a piece of content to be judged as fake or not. Especially when we talk about detection 
methods those distinct attributes are even more important. Consequently, even by 
definition the term proves to be inadequate to grasp all dimensions of information 
pollution. Additionally, the “fake news” virality started immediately after the US elections 
in 2016 and has been often used since then, in a political context characterizing any 
content that disagreed with a certain party. Alexios Mantzarlis, director of the Poynter 
Institute's International Fact-Checking Network, blames media for this confusion and the 
misuse of the term. [94] 
Even though 2016 was the year that the term fake news gained huge publicity, 
researchers have been pointing out its severity many years before that. The World 
Economic Forum and its Global Risks report from 2013 places misinformation as one of 
the modern dangers to society. [83] Massive digital misinformation is considered a global 
risk amongst others such as terrorism or cyber-attacks. The graph below shows how 
hyperconnectivity is the fueling power of potential digital wildfires. (Figure 1) 
 
  
Figure 1: Digital Wildfires in a Hyperconnected World, WEF Global Risks report 2013 [6] 
 
The inventor of world wide web, Sir Tim Burners Lee admits that it is too easy for 
misinformation to spread online placing this as one of the 3 challenges web faces today. 
[113] The European External Action Service has been working since 2015 to challenge 
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disinformation campaigns recognizing the danger that fake news poses to democracy via 
the exposure of citizens to large scale disinformation. In April 2017, Vice-President Andrus 
Ansip in charge of the completion of the Digital Single Market in the European 
Commission, [118] characterized fake news as a major online problem related to issues 
like the protection of freedom of speech, media literacy and quality journalism. One 
month later, European Commission President Juncker in a letter to the Commissioner for 
the Digital Economy and Society, pointed out the role of online platforms in disseminating 
false information and urges for actions at EU level to protect the citizens. [67] 
This significant amount of attention around information pollution which makes it seem 
like a modern issue, does not come out of nowhere. Information is power and when 
access to trusted information is hampered and at the same time false information is 
spread intentionally, then we are talking about an information warfare in the internet age. 
A google search of the term “fake news” gives about 700.000.000 results.  The rather 
vague and often misused term became wide popular in 2016. A search in Google Trends 
shows that the interest around fake news has risen sharply in November 2016 and kept 
increasing until January, when it reached an even higher volume. (Figure 2) This pattern 
has a very concrete explanation behind it and is inextricably tied to the US presidential 
elections held in 8/11/2016 and the campaign before that in favor of Donald Trump. Right 
after the elections Hillary Clinton made a speech where she focused on fake news and 
propaganda that prevailed in social media and how that had consequences to the real 
world, not only in politics but also posing danger at the lives of ordinary people 
threatening democracy.  [16] Even if it was not very clear that she referred to Trump’s 
victory, Trump realized that this could delegitimize his win, so he made a clever move 
returning the term back to the media, claiming that fake news is actually something 
designed to hurt him. In January 2017, president Trump, after calling a journalist fake 
news he made also a relevant tweet arrogating the term [34] (Figure 3) and ever since, 
politicians, journalists and other stakeholders have been calling “fake news” any content 
from advertisement and clickbait to propaganda and conspiracy theories. He even handed 
out “Fake News Awards" for 2017 [92]. The “winners” were reporters of some of the most 
famous media outlets of US, who had made errors or poor predictions concerning Trump 
himself, like for example the investigations into collusion between the Trump campaign 
and Russia. Even though when the awards were announced members of the media joked 
about this bizarre situation that seemed like a parody, others warned about how this 
could end up in violating ethical rules especially concerning the involvement of White 
House staff members. [66] 
But the damage had already been done, now that “fake news” can mean almost anything, 
it has actually lost every meaning.  
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Figure 2 – Google Trends. The term “fake news” from 2015-2018 
 
 
Figure 3 Donald Trump Fake news tweet [34] 
 
In Figure 4 we can see two of the most popular false information stories of 2016 that 
circulated in social media receiving around 2.000.000 engagements on Facebook in total 
by November that year. [54] With an article published in 03/11/2016 in Buzzfeed, editor 
Craig Silverman revealed that, in a small town in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia at least 140 political websites were launched publishing sensationalist and 
most of the times false content, that was aiming to supporters of Trump and especially 
conservatives in the US. [24]. To what extent may have those websites affected the results 
of the election cannot be easily answered and is out of scope of this thesis.  
Nevertheless, in a very extended research that has been made by the university of Exeter 
in January 2018 [8], it was estimated that 27.4% of Americans visited an article on a fake 
news website supporting either Trump or Clinton during the last weeks of 2016 election 
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campaign. If this sounds like a rather small percentage, it corresponds to 65 million 
people. 
 
 
Figure 4 Two of the most famous fake news stories [54] 
 
This story with the teenagers in FYROM creating and spreading false information through 
social media accounts is an excellent case study from many aspects.  As they have 
admitted [24] they don’t present themselves as supporters of Trump, their motivation is 
clearly economical, and it depicts a fraction of a complex advertising ecosystem operating 
as a black box. What they do is straightforward, they are producing false information 
addressing one of the richest advertising markets and especially Facebook, the world's 
largest social network.  The concept is simple, they start by creating a sensationalist 
headline, share it on Facebook and then generate traffic to their website. Increased 
number of clicks provides increased earnings from ads. The more traffic was generated 
the more generously those websites were rewarded by automated advertising engines, 
like Google’s AdSense. [1]. A Buzzfeed News analysis [25] found that during the last three 
months of the US presidential campaign the most famous fake election news stories on 
Facebook, outperformed those of manor news agencies, in terms of engagement. (Figure 
5) 
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Figure 5 Fake news election stories – Facebook engagement [54] 
 
There have been various surveys measuring the reach and dissemination of proved false 
information articles and many others expressing peoples’ concern and inability to discern 
it. But realizing and depicting the actual ideological, political, economic and social impact 
in the real world in a quantitative way is not an easy process.  From politics and elections 
to immigration and medicine issues, false information can have some very real and 
dangerous consequences. 
The elections’ integrity is questioned in the digital era and this is a worldwide 
phenomenon. From Italy, Sweden and France to Brazil, Israel, Kenya and Nigeria there is 
a debate focused on how online disinformation might influence the vote and cause social 
unrest. [102,128,129] 
A research that measured the reach of online disinformation in Europe and especially 
France and Italy, [109] showed that the level of Facebook interaction created by a small 
number of false news outlets was equal to or in some cases exceeded those produced by 
the most prominent news brands. In September 2018, during the last Swedish elections, 
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where political parties failed to form a coalition government, there was research proving 
that social networks contributed to the election results that led to this deadlock. 
In fact, Sweden where school students are taught to detect fake news, was prepared to 
tackle any attempt by Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns but instead 
disinformation on social media was homegrown as proved by the Oxford Internet 
Institute. 80% of the top false information stories were Swedish and many of them 
promoted anti-immigrant narratives, in favor of the Sweden Democrats, a party that has 
no willing coalition partners. [84] In Brazil where the most polarized election so far took 
place last October, it is said that false information deluged social media and especially 
Facebook and WhatsApp to the extent that it exceeded the accurate coverage of the 
campaigns. Disinformation spread over WhatApp before the elections targeting millions 
of Brazilians. [93] The electoral court of Brazil ordered Facebook to remove links to 33 
fake news articles that targeted a candidate with claims such as that he wanted to 
“sexualise” children. [33] In Nigeria communal violence was provoked by false claims 
circulated on Facebook. In head of the next year’s elections the Nigerian media are 
forming a coalition to tackle fake news. [129] In Africa WhatsApp is the most popular 
messaging application, and its end-to-end encryption makes it hard to monitor news as it 
propagates on the platform. During Kenya’s 2017 tense elections, 90% of population had 
heard or seen false stories related to the election according to a study. WhatsApp and 
Facebook were at the forefront of this dangerous fake news cycle. [Figure 6, 122] The 
responsible authorities in Kenya even set rules that could guide anyone who shared 
disputable political content on social media in jail for 5 years or paying a fine at the best-
case scenario. Google has announced its cooperation with fact-checking organizations like 
Africa Check to check online content. 
 
 
Figure 6 Social media as a key news conduit in Kenya's 2017 elections [122] 
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If politics and elections is one of the major fields that are closely related to false 
information, immigration is the second one.  There have been some studies in Germany 
and US which link the prevalence of social networks with an increase of hate crimes. In 
March 2018 Mueller and Schwarz [98] showed that there has been a rise in anti-Muslim 
hate crimes after Donald Trump's presidential campaign which included tweets about 
Islam topics and was focused in areas with high Twitter usage. The timing is important, 
hate crimes were committed after the start of his campaign. A similar study in Germany 
[97] suggests that social media apart from its role in spreading disinformation and hateful 
ideas, in some case they could also motivate real-life action. Especially they connected 
the significant social media presence of a right-wing party (AfD) and particularly the anti-
refugee sentiment on Facebook with violent crimes against refugees in municipalities 
where the social media usage was higher. 
 
The Policy Institute at King’s College London conducted a research in UK about Brexit 
public misperceptions comparing them with conclusions from the government-
commissioned Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) report. [124] The survey shows that 
there are important misperceptions around key facts for Brexit. Three of the subjects 
people were mostly wrong concerning European immigration were the crime increase, 
the decrease in quality of healthcare services and the increases in unemployment among 
lower skilled workers born in the UK [104] 
 
In Italy a Buzzfeed news investigation [1] suggests that a huge network of Italian news 
websites and Facebook pages owned by an entrepreneur in Rome were responsible for 
spreading false information. The content varied from misleading stories about tragic 
events to hyperpartisan stories about immigration, nationalist and Islamophobic rhetoric.  
 
Finland was the first European country to take action against disinformation. [51] In 
October 2018 a court has ordered three pro-Kremlin trolls to pay 136,000 euros to 
Jessikka Aro, a Finnish journalist who was the first to investigate Russia’s information 
operations and internet trolls. Since then, she was a target receiving systematic 
defamation consisting of a hate campaign that included from memes and parodies to false 
accusations and even death threats. The trolls also received prison terms. The verdict was 
considered a victory against online disinformation and hate speech. 
 
But false information doesn’t necessarily have to be triggered by special conditions like 
elections or social phenomenon like immigration. For those still wondering how an online 
conspiracy theory can have actual effect on real life, the best example come from India, 
one of the largest markets for WhatsApp. False rumors concerning child kidnappers went 
viral on the messaging application something that prompt mobs to kill two dozen of 
innocent people since April in 11 Indian states. The poor education of millions of Indians 
led them quickly to believe what they received on their phones. WhatsApp said it was 
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shocked by the violence and promised to take action after Indian authorities blamed the 
platform for irresponsibility. [125] 
 
Another example is the famous “pizzagate” story during presidential campaign in 2016 in 
the US.  The conspiracy theory blamed Hillary Clinton and John Podesta who used to run 
her campaign and whose mails had been hacked earlier, that they held a child sex ring at 
Comet Ping Pong a pizzeria in DC. The original Facebook post appeared on October 29th, 
2016. The story was reproduced by fake news and pro-Trump websites and found support 
by alt-right activists and Trump’s supporters who contributed to its astonishing 
engagement, embellishing it with sensationalist headlines. The result? On December 4 
the same year, Edgar Maddison Welch armed with three guns, entered the restaurant 
which was at the moment full of clients and children among them. (Figure 7, [6]) He fired 
on of his three guns, fortunately without victims as this could be another mass shooting. 
Employees and clients managed to leave the place while he was wondering around trying 
to find “evidence”. He said we wanted to investigate himself the online reports of children 
abuse. [6] This is just one of shocking example showing how online fabrications often 
blended with distorted] facts can have serious implications threatening not only 
democracy but human lives.  
 
Figure 7 The Pizzagate story - The arrest of Edgar Maddison Welch [6] 
 
Terror attack and intense weather phenomenon also offer a great field for fake news 
spread with equally disastrous effects. Hurricane Irma in US in 2017 caused real storm of 
fake news that even the White house tweeted a fake footage. In fact, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency had to create a list of associated rumors to keep people 
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informed. Indicatively more than 6 million people watched a fabricated live video of a 
storm that had taken place in Canada. 
The medicine realm is also not immune to false information attach and it is not difficult 
to imagine how pseudoscience, for example an anti-vaccination theory [29] or claims 
about weird cancer therapies can tremendously affect people’s lives.  The motivations 
vary, but fake medical news and easily gain publicity and attract interest increasing ad 
revenue. Doctors mention that they usually have to spend a lot of time to debunk false 
medical claims their patients have read on the web. [85] A study published in June 2018 
[105] showed how false medical news that spread in social media can harm public health. 
Analyzing links about common diseases in the period 2012-2017 they found that 40% of 
them contained false information. According to another research by The Independent, 
[78] false information about serious health conditions like cancer (Figure 8) or HPV, is 
shared more widely than evidence-based reports. Public Health England has expressed 
concern about the made-up health news shared online while the Cancer Research 
UK asked the social network to act.  
 
 
Figure 8 Example of made up scientific claim circulated in Facebook [78] 
 
According to a report by Euractiv [42], 3 million people die every year from vaccine-
preventable diseases.  The report links this with an online fake news bombardment of 
anti-vaccination campaigns that in recent years had a harmful effect on EU public health 
since some old diseases appeared again in Europe. 
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We can all realize how easily panic may spread, polarization might increase and what 
consequences that may have combined with malicious motives. And even when the fake 
news story is debunked, the impact is still there. The reason why people insist on false 
beliefs or embrace conspiracy theories even when truth is revealed, has roots in 
phycology and is out of scope of this study. It is worth to mention though that people 
accept more easily information that strengthens their prior beliefs (confirmation bias). 
[26] 
False information is nourished in troubled times. In times of social disorder people tend 
to believe stories that confirm their antipathy towards other groups. [19] It is important 
to keep in mind that online false information is not only a technology-driven phenomenon 
but is shaped by societies since topics of false stories strongly reflect national news 
agendas.  [37]  
 
Starting by the ability we have as human to distinguish fake from real the results are 
rather disappointing. The Stanford History Education Group (SHEG), conducted one of the 
biggest surveys showing how teens evaluate information they find online and one of their 
findings is that students actually have trouble judging the credibility of information online. 
[117] The various impacts may have not been analyzed extensively but they sure set an 
alarm for media literacy, user education, detection methods and self-regulatory 
frameworks for online platforms. 
In order to grasp the complexity of the above ecosystem, new definitions, frameworks 
and initiatives should be developed. A necessity to identify all involving stakeholders and 
investigate their role, motives, impact, actions is becoming essential. Enclosing all 
different entities and concepts, under a unified framework, considering all different 
interactions is a complex and ongoing process and certainly no static considering the 
digital disruption era.   
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Chapter 2 Scope and Methodology  
 
2.1 Scope 
 
It is clear by now that there is an ongoing discussion around the digital information 
ecosystem and the implications and concerns raised by the spread of false information. 
Having identified already some critical stakeholders of the information disorder problem 
and underlined a broad range of impacts, we believe that there is a very concrete need 
for contributing towards further understanding and clarifying critical aspects. 
Diving into the unique attributes of the entities of this network and the relationships 
amongst them, many research areas emerge. From the users’ point of view media literacy 
and crowdsourcing tools, from the platforms side the urge for technical adaptations in 
their algorithms for transparency and detection methods, from the tools side advanced 
detection algorithms following the emerging technologies, from the state side policies, 
frameworks and regulations to tackle disinformation ensuring freedom of speech and 
media plurality. Our interest is on two topics deriving from the information pollution 
problem, resulting in a dual scope. 
On the first part in chapter 3 we study the role and special characteristics of social media 
platforms and their contribution in the amplification of the phenomenon along with the 
new online advertising business models. Recognizing the fact that disinformation touches 
a broad segment of actors in the ecosystem, they all have a significant role and 
responsibilities in the battle against information pollution. In this context, we are also 
identifying code of practices and platform policies that have been published in order to 
tackle disinformation and see how these relate to rules and disciplines of traditional 
media.  
In chapter 4 our focus is on definitions and types of information disorder. Studying the 
literature, we have identified a long list of terms, often used interchangeably to describe 
specific types of disinformation content. The lack of common language is a problem when 
working on new methods and initiatives under a common goal. Throughout our research, 
a very fragmented landscape was shaped concerning definitions. The confusion around 
the term “fake news” was inherited to many research works. Having clear definitions of a 
problem is a first step towards tackling it. Consequently, our intention was to identify, 
and study suggested taxonomies of false information and create a dictionary of all terms 
used in literature to describe types of false information. From this long list of terms and 
after applying some filtering based on logical questions, we conclude to our own list of 
disinformation types. Finally, we introduce a unified framework for all main types of 
disinformation mapping each of our types with categorization dimensions extracted from 
literature.  
17 
 
2.2 Methodology 
 
For the first part of this thesis, the role of social media in the information disorder 
ecosystem and the study of initiatives and policies, a web survey methodology was 
selected. Taking into account the dynamics of the discussion around disinformation, the 
recency of global attention and the variety of selected sources including websites and 
platforms, a survey was considered the best option. Studying a phenomenon that is 
radically changing it seems more appropriate to use an unstructured method to be able 
to follow the constant flow of news and updates which have not necessarily yet been 
captured in papers.  
Our research here was focused on platforms and their released policies, surveys and 
research from Europe and USA on the use of social media and their connection with 
spread of false information, responses by the new online advertising model stakeholders 
such as IAB Europe, the European-level industry association for the digital advertising 
ecosystem and of course reports and actions published by European Commission to tackle 
disinformation. Our work was also well supported by sources on the internet such as from 
Poynter organization, First draft, Medium, IAB, Co-inform and many trusted websites like 
Buzzfeednews, Gartner, Fortune, Statista. 
Concerning chapter 4 a formal and structured method was considered more appropriate 
to encounter all relevant work around taxonomies. We followed a systematic literature 
review approach based on Kitchenham’s et al. methodological guidelines. The research 
of the articles started in July 2018 and was completed in October 2018. By following this 
formal method with explicit inclusion and exclusion criteria, we intend to provide a 
replicable research review with minimal bias arising from review process itself.   
During our research, we encountered additional types of false information that were 
found in the literature but were not under a taxonomy framework. In order to have a 
holistic view of this spectrum we decided to expand our search and review the literature 
out of the framework of taxonomical models, extending our typology with additional 
types of false information having as an ultimate goal to further strengthen our model.  
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Chapter 3 Social media and initiatives mapping 
 
3.1 The role of social media in the information disorder ecosystem 
 
3.1.1 Moving from traditional news to social media-based news consumption 
 
Internet and social media have changed dramatically the way people create, share, 
receive and interpret information. The online communication channels people use in their 
everyday lives are those that make them take consciously or unconsciously decisions, 
since the received information is guiding the decision-making process.  
In this context, we are studying the role of social media in the information disorder 
ecosystem with the shift from traditional journalism to social media era and the 
connection between their increased use and the rise of false information. We are focusing 
on some special characteristics of those platforms and the role of digital advertising and 
content monetization, that foster the amplification of false information. 
The underlying technology of social media has amplified the profound changes in the 
news creation process and created an environment where disinformation may spread 
easier. The main differences between traditional and internet news process are that 
content no longer needs to be created by professionals, content creators may be 
anonymous, the absence of editorial policy, unlimited publication space and finally the 
extremely vital role consumers play as gatekeepers and amplifiers of information, able to 
decide through new technologies what other consumers also consume. [131] The below 
Figure 9 models the differences between traditional and internet news process. Including 
those described above we could say that the absence of a single point where content can 
be created, exchanged and controlled is one of the main characteristics of this new era.  
Figure 9 Traditional VS Internet news process [ 86] 
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The online economy evolves rapidly and touches virtually every aspect of our lives and 
social media redefine the global landscape. Borrowing the concepts of Porter’s five forces 
model, we would say that considering a news market operating on social networks the 
barriers to entry are low because the costs of entry and content production are trivial. 
This is a major deviation from traditional media that has significantly reduced the editorial 
quality control in news distribution. 
 
3.1.2 The rise and dynamics of social media as news channels 
 
Social media’s role as facilitators and gatekeepers of information [45] brings fundamental 
changes in the digital news ecosystem. One impact of this new model is the dissemination 
and increase of false information. [43] This significant role and the implications have been 
discussed extensively. 
 Algorithm driven platforms including social media websites, account for 67% of online 
news consumption. [15] The percentage is astonishing and statistics just confirm the focus 
with which the social media usage should be treated.  The social network users for 2017 
were 2.46 billion, one third of Earth’s population.  Fake news websites gain most of their 
traffic from social media referrals according to a survey during the US elections which 
proves that the rise of false information is linked to the rise of social media [58]  
The rise in the use of social media is clearly depicted in a survey by Statista showing a 
steady increase from 2012 to 2017 on the average time spent worldwide on social media, 
reaching 135 minutes the previous year. ([80], Figure 10) In the same figure another 
interesting element associated also with the spread of false information is the device 
usage as of January 2018 of Facebook, which is the most popular social network 
worldwide, with 95% of users accessing it via their smartphones. [82] Social media 
platforms serve as a tool for those who gain from the rapid spread of fake news raising 
several socio-technical challenges. [90] 
 
Referral data also gives useful insights, as in a relevant research has been found that “fake 
news” stories relied mainly on social media during the US elections in 2016. The top news 
sites had 10.1% of their traffic coming from social media whereas almost half traffic for 
the fake news sites came from social (41.8%). [58] Figure 11 
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Figure 11: Traffic drivers to real and fake news. [ 58] 
 
Taking a look at the subjects that circulated the most, in a very comprehensive study by  
Soroush & Aral published in Science magazine [114] conducted with Twitter posts from 
2006 to 2017, we can see that politics was the largest category, followed by urban 
Figure 10 Social media time usage & device Statista [80] 
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legends, business, terrorism. The histogram shows the total number of rumor cascades 
across the seven most frequent categories (Figure 12) 
 
 
Figure 12: Major Twitter fake news diffusion study from 2006 to 2017 [114] 
 
 
It is interesting to see how users accept this new reality, if they realize the problem and 
what is the impact that may have in their attitude. In the Flash 464 Eurobarometer report 
on “Fake News and Disinformation Online”, we see the results of a survey carried out on 
behalf of the European Commission in February 2018 collecting data from the 28 
member-states. [123] 85% of respondents said that they consider fake news as a problem 
in their country most of them also said this is a problem for democracy. In every country 
at least, half people said they come across fake news at least once a week, and 37% every 
day. Greece holds one of the higher percentages 74%, with 55% of the respondents 
replying that they encounter false information daily. Considering trust in various sources, 
47% trust online newspapers and magazines and this percentage drops significantly when 
it comes to online social networks (27%).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
According to a new survey conducted from July 30 to August 12, 2018, by Pew Research 
center concerning the news use Across Social Media Platforms for 2018 in the US, [76] 
68% of adults often choose to receive their news on social media, with Facebook being 
the most popular platform. Interestingly though at the same time they appear dubious 
on the received information, since 57% of them share the belief that the news may be 
inaccurate. Inaccuracy is the major concern respondents mentioned along with others 
such as bias and low quality. (Figure 13)  
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There is a paradox with the high use of social media for news and at the same time the 
low trust on the received information but also the platforms themselves. That could be 
explained from the benefits people experience when getting news on social media like 
speed, convenience and social interaction. [76] 
 
 
In the Reuters Digital News Report 2018 [100], we see a recent decline in the use of social 
media for news. While from 2013 there has been a steady growth it seems that this is 
changing now. (Figure 14) The milestone of US elections is probably related also but for 
the first time we see how changes in Facebook’s algorithm affect such an important 
metric. In July 2017 Facebook published a document committing to prioritize friends’ 
interests over publishers.  Later in August it announced a change in the newsfeed 
algorithm to decrease the clickbait articles and a few days later it released an enhanced 
ad preference option. On January 2018 Facebook announced again that it would alter its 
algorithm in order to decrease referral traffic to publishers by prioritizing posts from 
friends and family. [11,74,77,107] All these changes are depicted in Figure 15, a graph 
from Parse.ly showing the decrease of referrals from Facebook to news websites from 
February 2017 until March 2018. [100] This is a powerful example of how change in 
platforms policies may affect the news consumption and thus contribute to the decrease 
of false information spread. 
 
Figure 13 News use Across Social Media Platforms – Pew Research center [76] 
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Figure 14 Proportion using social media as news source. (last week base 2013–18) [100] 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 Proportion of referrals to news websites from fakebook (Feb 2017–Mar 2018) [100] 
 
 
Our news consumption habits, like any other behavior, are shaped by some factors. 
Reuters Digital News Report 2018 [100] examines how different levels of media literacy 
might affect the news source people prefer. One of their findings is that people with 
higher levels of literacy choose newspaper websites whereas those with lower literacy 
level tend to prefer social media.  In the Eurobarometer survey respondents that had a 
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higher level of education said they encountered more often fake news but also felt more 
confident its identification. [123] 
 
If we could describe in one word this powerful connection of social media and the spread 
of false information that would be engagement. Defined as any interaction users have 
with online content depending on the platform such as, likes, shares, tweets and 
comments. Engagement is actually the backbone of social media and a vital part of any 
social media marketing strategy.  
 
In a very extensive survey focused in Twitter by Soroush et Al presented in March 2018, 
it has been proved that false information spreads farther, faster, deeper, and more 
broadly than the truth in all categories of information. [114] In the same survey it has 
been proved that humans and not bots are mainly responsible for sharing fake news and 
there is also a very interesting sentiment analysis. The reading of true stories evokes joy, 
sadness and anticipation while fake stories’ more intriguing and novelty character, evoke 
anxiety, shock, disgust and amazement. Thus, emotions and feelings do have an 
important role on our decision whether to share something in social media. The rationale 
behind that lies in human behavior and touches disciplines from linguistics, psychology 
and social science. 
 
 
 
3.1.3 Social media – Innovative characteristics 
 
Having seen so far, the rise and dynamics of social media as news channels and the related 
concurrent increase of false information dissemination, it is useful to study some of the 
most prominent characteristics of social media that contribute towards this implication. 
Online user experience is the holy grail for any website and application.  The way people 
experience news is affected by social networks. The newsfeed is a mixture of private and 
public posts, and news are intertwined with any other life activity. This friendly and 
comfort browsing experience is so different than the experience of visiting an online 
newspaper.   
We have already seen that 95% of users access Facebook via their smartphone. The exact 
interaction through which people receive information via their social media accounts, 
thus the newsfeed format and the mobile phone, allows little judgement of the accuracy 
of the perceived information. [47] When users receive information from socially 
proximate sources they are encouraged to legitimate the veracity of information, but they 
rarely check the veracity of the information they share [38]. This is pretty intense 
especially when access is done via mobile and among younger users who access 
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information quickly, without critical thinking, like a fast food philosophy for news -
consumption. [58, 123] 
It seems that social media’s playful character, makes users be more on a fun and relaxed 
mode while scrolling down, thus less reluctant to any post that might appeared irrelevant 
or suspicious of malicious content than when exposed to something similar on a famous 
news website. This is also related to the comfortable newsfeed experience where 
important and personal real-life. events are mixed with news. 
Social media has some fundamental characteristics when it comes to news creation and 
consumption. First it is very easy for anyone to edit, publish and distribute content. 
Second the information is now publicly consumed and at an amazing speed. It should be 
also noted that social networks discourage people’s ability to argue on the accuracy of 
the content, as false and real content present similarities.  [19] Social media have such a 
unique structure, not only in terms of distribution but also on news’s appearance which 
contradicts traditional news format. 
 
On the distribution part, content may be circulated without any validation control like 
fact-checking or editorial judgement. [58] For example, a piece of content like a Tweet 
which cannot exceed 140 characters can be considered news if it comes from an 
accredited sender. The concept of the information source is difficult to be discerned in 
social media and this is exonerated [38]. And since little attention is paid on sources and 
fact checking procedures, anyone can produce false or low-quality content as an 
authoritative legitimate source behind a fake profile or using sock puppets, with unclear 
malicious motives and spread it real fast. 
 
 
3.1.4 The dangers of radical Personalization  
 
Marshall McLuhan had said that the medium is the message, but in today's data-driven 
era of radical personalization, consumer is the message. It's been 22 years since Bill Gates 
declared the famous phrase “content is king” and here we are in a place where context 
shapes content. While information travels on the internet it is adjusted to various 
contexts and this has mainly been realized by the personalized algorithms running on the 
platforms side. Online platforms are formatting the structure and ranking of content 
based on personalized algorithms and this is a disruption digital world is facing. 
The newsfeed and search engines use sophisticated algorithms that adjust and rank 
content from the huge volumes available, so that they keep it relevant with user’s 
preferences. Human attention has a limited capacity [30] so providing relevant and 
sticking content that will keep users engaged for longer is essential.  Online user behavior, 
interests and browsing habits are usually the input of those algorithms. Actually, the 
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whole user browsing experience is much shaped by these algorithms, like for example the 
search results from a typical google search, is guided through previous searches of this 
specific user account. [13]  
The absence of news plurality caused by radical personalization can cause information 
bias. The increasingly personalized content can possibly create echo chambers or filter 
bubbles, since the recommended content is in line with users’ pre-beliefs and comforts 
them instead of challenging.  Filter bubbles or echo chambers is a phenomenon where 
people tend to agree with opinions that match their own believes, usually coming from 
people that share the same philosophy. [45]. In fact, research shows that even if we 
suspect that a message is false, when it comes from a trusted person, we considerate it 
as true. [95]. People spend time in echo chambers, because it requires less intellectual 
work. [96] Receiving information that does not contradict our beliefs is easier.   
 
World Wide Web Foundation founded by Sir Tim Burners Lee, funded a research in 2017 
to examine how Facebook’s algorithms control the information to which users are 
exposed. [127] They ran an experiment in Argentina in 2017, with six identical Facebook 
profiles that also followed the same news sources on Facebook. Some of the most 
interesting findings were the complete lack of exposure to certain posts, and that even 
users with almost identical profile received different exposure to different articles from 
the same news sites they followed.  
So, we see that even when people have identical profiles in terms of preferences, 
Facebook’s algorithm offers a curated experience, with diversified information. This 
filtering function seems to be based on arbitrary factors on which users have no control 
and sometimes they are not even aware they see an adjusted reality.  
 
The impact is that algorithms senselessly increase polarized news climate by limiting 
exposure to a variety of sources, making them less visible. [107,36,39] This operational 
model questions the impartiality of platforms related to the content that is being hosted.  
Social by design, the algorithm’s expected outcome may not be predicted, but it is very 
clear that there is lack of transparency and absence of choices on behalf of users 
intervening in the algorithm and thus formatting the received information. [7,76] 
Even though the word platform itself indicates some neutrality, this is rather deceptive. 
[46] Platforms do not just reproduce content.  They are a major partner of a complex 
ecosystem which’s critical operations like content ranking and advertisement placement 
are opaque. [19]  
 
Personalization may lead to biased amplification and echo chambers and this is one part 
of the price we need to pay. The second would be the existence of this black-box filtering 
logic which takes obscure inclusion/exclusion decisions on news and sources shaping our 
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information diet. In combination with the increasing number of users that choose to 
receive their news via social media, that could lead to information silos and a fragmented 
the news ecosystem which challenges a shared understanding of reality. Information that 
users receive online may shape their decision and have profound effects as we have seen 
on politics, societies, economies and cultures. Considering the multidimensional digital 
information ecosystem someone might say that, a thin line is drawn between freedom of 
speech, truth and transparency.  
 
 
3.1.5 The new online advertising model 
 
Digitization has transformed the news industry, placing market power and revenue 
streams from news publishers to platform operators who have the data to target the right 
users, with the right ads, on the right time and in an efficient way. [15] Social media and 
online platforms operate under complex business models that rely on monetizing 
visibility.  
Having studied the role of social media it is important to study also the new economic 
structures that fuel fake news and are also on the backbone of the social platforms. Online 
digital advertising has introduced major changes on how ads are placed and sold. The use 
of false information attracts more clicks to websites, contributing to increase of income 
from advertisers. 
 
Dipayan Ghosh, a former Facebook executive says that disinformation concerning the US 
election succeeded because it benefits from the strategy of the digital advertising market 
and is associated with Facebook’s role as an advertising platform. [3] The whole industry 
is built using sophisticated technology to attract user attention and sell advertising. 
Advertisers and platforms share common interests. 
 
IAB Europe, the European-level industry association for the digital advertising ecosystem 
in cooperation with IHS Markit, provide research reports highlighting the contribution of 
digital advertising to the European economy. [60] Digital advertising in Europe stands for  
37.2% of all advertising revenue while the market has doubled from 2012 to 2017 
reaching 48bn for total digital ad spend (Figure 16) with marketers spending €64.4 per 
person on digital advertising for 2017. The rise in mobile advertising is also highlighted 
expecting to double its revenues by 2020 reaching €22bn.  
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Figure 16. Digital ad spend: Historical perspective. AdEx Benchmark Study 2017. IAB Europe & IHS Markit 
[60] 
 
In their ADEX Benchmark report for 2017 [61] they present for the first time, social data 
as a subset of display advertising. Treating social media display ads separately is a very 
important milestone indicative of the power social media advertising has.   David Barker, 
Managing Director of a global digital marketing technology company finds this pivot very 
interesting as this growth has forced changes in major agencies, highlighting the 
importance of working with the right technology vendors who can empower them with 
their integrated platforms.  
 
The unprecedent data access social platforms offer, guides marketers to plan a whole new 
programmatic approach based on social media to uncover the customer journey. [7] That 
explains the growth of social display ad which also served as a crucial growth driver for 
display in general for 2017 (Figure 17) 
 
 
Figure 17 Social vs Other Display Ad Spend Growth in 2017 (AdEx Benchmark Study 2017. IAB Europe & IHS 
Markit 
29 
 
 
 
 
A comparison with the US and global market would be very interesting but out of scope 
of this thesis as we are studying these issues from another perspective, that of 
information disorder. The findings of the corresponding report conducted by PWC on 
behalf of IAB, only confirm that US actually affects the global market in such marketing 
parameters like in any other industry creating similar patterns. It’s worth to mention 
though that in the US Facebook and Google account for at least 90% of the growth in 
digital advertising market. [81,91] The volumes of course differ, since the total digital ad 
spending was $88 billion for 2017 with social media’s share at $22.2 billion, increasing 
36% from previous year. [106] Thus those tech giants almost monopolize the market 
creating a digital ad market duopoly proving their stronghold over advertising customers 
which raises concerns about monopolistic practices. 
 
These numbers explain why selling a product to the US Facebook audience market is 
different than selling elsewhere.  In Facebook’s earning presentation for the first quarter 
of 2018, we can see one of the most important metrics and that is the Average Revenue 
per User (ARPU). [49] The adverting revenue per user for US and Canada is 23,14$ 
whereas for Europe is 8,01$. So, a US Facebook user’s ad value is three times more than 
a European. US and Canada are Facebook’s biggest customer base.  (Figure 18) 
 
 
Figure 18 Facebook earning report Q1 2018 Results – ARPU [49] 
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For the Internet advertising model, the goal is to increase advertising revenue. This is 
done via increasing traffic using sophisticated algorithms. The veracity of the displayed 
content is of minor importance converting disinformation into hard currency [47] Data is 
an asset and there is a growing value of digital content. In the digital world, information 
is the new currency and the tech giants have proved that there are plenty of opportunities 
to monetize information. Since disinformation has some characteristics that make it 
spread deeper and faster than truth [114] the parallel to a hard currency is easy to 
imagine. 
 
In order to understand how the dissemination of false information might be favored in 
the online advertising world it is useful to study the underlying technology of 
programmatic advertising.  Programmatic advertising characterized as the future of ad 
buying is the use of software to automatically purchase digital advertising, via real-time 
bidding (RTB) and automation using an AI component to optimize ad runs. The system 
learns which campaigns will perform better. [63,71] The benefits for marketers is that 
they can create impressions and engagement, in an automated way using data signals 
from the customer digital journey. [40] This is actually the ideal situation of how this 
model should work but reality always has a price as it seems that quantity is sacrificed 
over quality. The automated open exchanges were associated with advertising inventory 
issues like bots’ fraud and brand safety issues.  
 
The main difference with the previous ad model is the complete lack of quality control or 
a verification process. Consequently, the outlet profile in which the ad will appear is no 
longer important, instead the number of clicks or views it will receive from a target 
demographic, is crucial and this is actually what the advertiser buys. In the below graph 
(Figure 19) by London School of Economics [27], we see the distribution path and 
incentives of content realized by digital ads using the advertising model described above. 
Here is a brief description of how it works. Advertisers buy programmatic advertising, 
meaning they actually buy clicks and views. Then the ad agency through an ad network 
or a platform like Google and Facebook, serves the ads to the users through an automated 
real-time auction. This auction is based on the algorithms described above that are fed 
with data about personal preferences. The advertisers are being charged and the 
payments are transferred to publishers while the intermediary (ad agency or platforms) 
also takes commissions. [27] 
 
Now the publisher from his side who could be an accredited news agency, or a fake news 
website owned by a Macedonian teenager like in the example described earlier, also 
works with the ad network and platforms. The goal of the publisher is to increase its web 
traffic by maximizing views/clicks to receive an increased revenue from the platforms.  
Sometimes the number of clicks is more essential to the intermediary and the publisher 
than the advertiser. So, the brand exposure next to questionable content is something 
the advertiser cannot control and raises issues of brand safety. All entities in this network 
benefit, with publishers getting the lion’s share. 
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Figure 19 How programmatic advertising works [27] 
 
 
One of the reasons programmatic advertising deserves such attention is because it is 
expected to account for 58% of total digital display expenses. [10]  EMarketer expects 
that by 2019, the programmatic digital ad spending will reach $9.23 billion in the US and 
advertisers ask programmatic tech players to fight false information. [87] The News 
Media Association (NMA) in UK in its submission to the Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee’s inquiry into fake news, [99] asked for an investigation into Google and 
Facebook and their role in digital advertising supply chain to tackle fake news. The NMA 
chairman emphasizes that this digital supply chain rewards the content distributors and 
that the impact of Google-Facebook duopoly on the media landscape, cannot be ignored.  
 
In April 2017 Yahoo BrightRoll conducted a survey with programmatic decision makers in 
the US.  Fake news is a major concern in the programmatic advertising community, since 
96% professionals are worried about it and 31% of them say they are willing to reduce 
their spending with partners that have been associated with fake news while 43% claim 
to end cooperation with fake news publishers. [32] This concern was increased after the 
US elections of 2016 where ad-supported websites were created consisting of fake news 
stories but attracted huge engagement especially via Facebook traffic. Questionable 
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content was ran even by legitimate publishers, exposing brands who saw their ads 
running next to false content raising brand safety issues. It is not easy to predict the future 
of programmatic advertising, but the reallocation of digital advertising revenues to 
Google and Facebook seems to foster the fake news industry. The false information 
operators exploit the Facebook and Google algorithms creating sensational content that 
lacks any quality control without any regard to accuracy. 
 
Now that we have taken a closer look to the role of social media in the information 
disorder ecosystem, emphasizing on some unique attributes, as a closing statement of 
this chapter we have gathered some main characteristics originating from our research, 
that foster the amplification of false information on those platforms. (Figure 20) 
 
The role of social media as news channels present major differences with the traditional 
news model. Social media as a news market offers extremely low barriers to entry 
whereas the absence of quality assurance points, editorial standards and fact checking, 
enables the dissemination of false information.  The social network technology backbone, 
where the ease of creation, amplification and dissemination by users, in combination with 
unprecedent speed, further allows disinformation to spread faster and deeper. From a 
technical point of view the presence of bots and fake accounts further support malicious 
actors in the dissemination of false information and cause large scale engagement. The 
underlying personalized algorithms operate in an opaque way allowing microtargeting 
with emotional ads according to users’ profile. This curated online experience fosters the 
formation of filter bubble and echo chambers. Finally, the accuracy-ignorant advertising 
business models based on content monetization, are disregarding quality over quantity 
contributing to the increase of information pollution. [114,58,19,43,13,30,90,131] 
 
 
Figure 20 Main characteristics of social media platforms related to the spread of disinformation  
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Social technology makes us witness something entirely new. A complex network of 
motivations for creating and spreading false information, advanced techniques for 
sophisticated fabrications and dissemination mechanisms, platforms for reproducing this 
content and of course with breakneck speed. The context in which disinformation is 
evolved also matters, especially when the media sector is going through this deep 
transformation. The role of the platforms is closely linked to news business, with their 
content monetization business models, acting as aggregators and distributors, exploiting 
network effects but without sharing editorial and quality responsibilities.  
 
There is no doubt that social media and ad agencies are amongst the key stakeholders in 
the digital information ecosystem which is undergoing profound changes. Understanding 
who is part of the problem is the first essential step towards solving it. 
 
 
 
3.2 Initiatives and practices developed to tackle information disorder 
 
Information disorder is considered a global issue, reported to have caused social and 
political damage even extreme violence in some. As a result, people are losing trust not 
only in digital but also in traditional news media.  Disinformation which is triggered by 
wider socioeconomic changes like economic factors, extremism, and cultural changes, 
[21] harms democracy and fosters polarization hampering the decision-making process of 
citizens.  
 
In this context key stakeholders have started developing practices and initiatives in an 
attempt of tackling the phenomenon. The first important step is to share responsibility 
for the spread of disinformation and the academic world has put some pressure on that.  
This leads to our discussion on identifying code of practices, actions, responses and 
policies released by platforms, institutes and state actors, search for similarities and see 
how these relate to the online adverting model and the platforms characteristics. 
 
We have identified major initiatives that have been developed to tackle disinformation 
by major stakeholders such as European Commission, Google, Facebook, Poynter and 
Unesco starting from 2015 until October 2018. In the below timeline, seventeen different 
initiatives are presented as milestones. (Figure 21) Of course our work does not exhaust 
all initiatives that might have been developed globally during this time. We have chosen 
to focus on EU for state-oriented initiatives and USA, the base of tech giants (Google and 
Facebook) who are the top actors of information disorder ecosystem.  
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Of course, other countries apart from Europe and USA have issued their own initiatives, 
or even law fines for false information spreading, like Malaysia who has been judged for 
getting closer to dictatorship [73]. Poynter has published a guide to map existing 
legislation and actions around the world that have been created to tackle disinformation. 
[28]  
 
Having our timeline as a guide, we will go through the key elements of those milestones.     
 
As we can see, in the first months of 2017 there is a high concentration of initiatives 
probably triggered by the US elections in November 2016 and the “fake news” 
discussions. Then after March 2018 we also see intense activity especially by the EU. That 
could be explained in anticipation of the EU elections in 2019, as there are worries for 
new scandals. [70] But actually, it is part of a broader plan starting on June 2017 when 
the European Parliament asked the Commission to analyze the fake news situation and 
legal framework and investigate the possibility of legal intervention to limit the spreading 
of false information. [44]  
 
The European External Action Service has been working since 2015 [50] to challenge 
disinformation campaigns recognizing the danger that fake news poses to democracy. In 
March 2015, the European Council’s action plan resulted in establishing East Stratcom 
Task Force to face disinformation campaigns of Russia. [41] Ever since Commission has 
issued a plan under the Digital Single Market strategy, to tackle fake news recognizing it 
as a threat to European values and democratic systems.  Important components towards 
this direction have been realized, such as a High Level Group of Experts, a public 
consultation and a Eurobarometer survey, resulting in the recently published on 
26/09/2018 Code of practice on Disinformation, a self-regulatory Code of Practice to 
address the spread of online disinformation, opening windows for regulatory further 
actions. (Figure 22) [50,44]                                                              
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Figure 21 Disinformation Initiatives Timeline 
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Figure 22 EU comprehensive plan to tackle fake news. [50] 
 
 
The International Fact Checking Network (IFCN) at Poynter dedicated to promoting 
excellence in fact-checking, launched a Code of Principles in September 2016. Thirty-five 
organizations from 27 countries were the initial signatories such as Factcheck.org, Full 
Fact, PolitiFact, Snopes and the Washington Post's Fact Checker. The signatories of the 
code abide by commitments for nonpartisanship and fairness, sources transparency, 
transparency of funding & organization, transparency of methodology, and a 
commitment for publishing their honest corrections policy. [4,57] 
Facebook and Google attached importance to the Code, when Facebook announced its 
third-party fact-checker should be signatories of this Code as a minimum requirement 
[12] and Google also highlighted fact checks produced by signatories of the code in its 
search engine results. This wide acceptance and trust led IFCN to launch a verification 
process in March 2017. The goal was to guarantee minimum standards through an 
evaluation process by external assessors. The successful completion of this process allows 
the signatories to carry a trustworthiness badge confirming compliance with the IFCN 
principles. (Figure 23) The first report of this verification process was released in March 
2018 to discuss main lessons from this procedure for example on how the standards have 
been put in place and opportunities but also the difficulties encountered. By the time this 
report was published 58 organizations had obtained the verification, while the applicants 
were more than 70 organizations. [62] That was a very prominent initiative as it is the first 
approach to establish an official assessment procedure similar to quality standards we are 
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used to seeing in other industries and could lead the way to compliance protocols for 
other actors of the information disorder ecosystem.  
 
Figure 23 IFCN Code of Principles Verification process [62] 
 
 
Platforms have been taking some measures such as blocking ads from pages that share 
repeatedly false stories, removing malicious accounts and trying to prioritize trustworthy 
publications. [59] For all those scattered actions there seems to be an effort to be put 
under a framework with coordinated activities. 
   
On November 12, 2016, Mark Zuckerberg Facebook's founder, expressed his opinion in a 
post that it was almost impossible for hoaxes to change the elections outcome, despite 
the BuzzFeed analysis and Pew research findings discussed earlier. An open letter 
followed by 20 fact-checkers suggesting that Facebook should put in place efforts for a 
more accurate newsfeed. Almost a year after that representatives from the main social 
media platforms found themselves testifying in the American Senate on the possibility 
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that viral disinformation spread on the platforms could influence the US elections. 
[121,130] 
A few days later, on November 19 Mark Zuckerberg shared a new post announcing new 
steps for tackling fake news describing it as a complex problem both from a technological 
and philosophical perspective. Possibly under pressure since its not usual to share 
elements of work in progress.  Zuckerberg refrained from holding the role of arbiters of 
truth instead he said prefers to delegate partial authority for that on community and 
trusted third parties. One of the main points was that of “disrupting the economics” of 
fake news, realizing that at least part of disinformation was enabled by Facebook’s 
advertisement mechanism. Other measures / ideas included improved false information 
classification technology, easier reporting for users, third party verification and flags and 
labelling of stories.  [88]  
On December the same year Facebook started placing red warning icons next to fake 
news stories assessed by fact-checkers. This approach didn’t prove to be successful as 
sometimes as Facebook said, it urged users to share the dubious links more often. So 
instead, it started displaying “related articles" from reliable sources next to disputed news 
stories something that reduced the share of hoax articles. [14] Facebook refers to 
signatories of the IFCN Code of Principles the most popular dubious stories that 
potentially violate its principles according to user flagging. If they confirm that a story is 
false, this will be communicated to users via the labels and appear lower in Newsfeed. 
[22] (Figure 24) 
 
 
Figure 24 Facebook Flagging & Related Articles policy [22] 
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Along with the IFCN verification process in March 2017, there were two other important 
initiatives. The “Joint declaration on freedom of expression and “fake news”, 
disinformation and propaganda” was an initiative by  United Nations Special Rapporteur 
on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, and was signed among others by the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe Representative on Freedom of the Media, the 
Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. [79] It identifies general principles 
to deal with false information issues, emphasizing a lot on freedom of expression, media 
diversity and and digital literacy on behalf of the states. Concerning the intermediaries 
and their role it emphasizes that any policies or practices about content regulation should 
be clear to users giving the opportunity to contest on any restrictive actions. 
Intermediaries should also research and develop technological solutions to tackle 
disinformation. The declaration generally resembles a legal document with articles, it is 
quite generic, but we see its contribution in identifying some relevant stakeholders like 
the state, the digital intermediaries, media and journalists.  
 
It is interesting to see how another tech giant, Google is responding, maybe by not 
explicitly publishing a policy of commitments, but by diving deep into its very essential 
technical operations which is not other than its quality rating guidelines for page ranking. 
Google contracts with quality raters worldwide to evaluate its search results. Raters use 
a set of quality guidelines that instructs them on how to evaluate quality of a website and 
the search performance, in terms of results meeting the needs of those who perform the 
searches.  [68] 
 
In March 2017 google updated those guidelines to tackle fake news, poor quality sites 
with suspicious scientific claims, clickbait and hate sites. According to Google low or 
lowest quality is given to inaccurate and misleading information presented as fact, 
fabrications, absence of source citation, websites that impersonate other sites, a website 
that looks like a news source, but its content tries to manipulate users. Also, for the first 
time clickbait titles are being targeted when the content is not delivering what title 
promised. Google also sets characteristics for high quality pages in terms of high level of 
expertise, authoritativeness, and trustworthiness (EAT). [68,108] The guidelines were 
further revised in July 2018 focusing on the reputation of content creators, a page’s 
beneficial purpose and intensifying the war against clickbait. [69] That is a very important 
milestone even though it raises questions, like how google decides for content. A careful 
look at the complete guide of 2017 and especially those parts created for disinformation 
reveals a fascinating relation with false information characteristics. Besides, judging a 
website for hosting / enabling false information should be in accordance with parameters 
when judging a piece of content. 
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Facebook’s next move was on April 2017 when it updated its work on fighting 
misinformation in Facebook for media website. Nothing really different than Zuckerberg 
himself posted in November 2016 apart from some improvements in ranking and 
reporting by the users. It also announced its cooperation with the News Literacy program, 
a national education nonprofit organization and its participation as a founding funder in 
the News Integrity Initiative, an independent global consortium aiming at fake news. Its 
mission is to promote news literacy, increase trust in journalism and help people make 
informed decisions. The announcement closes by a call out to other actors like technology 
and media companies, educational institutions to all work together for fighting the spread 
of misinformation and false news. [2] Similar to UN’s report again we see the main actors 
repeated, interestingly though Facebook avoids placing itself along with other 
“technology companies” instead uses the word “community” describing its role.  
 
In September 2017 a very comprehensive report was published often mentioned in the 
present work as well titled “Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework 
for research and policy making” published by the Council of Europe as a response to 
growing concerns of member states for the implications of disinformation campaigns. 
[19] For the first time, authors define three different types of “information disorder”, 
misinformation, disinformation and malinformation which will be explained in the next 
chapter. They also distinguish three main elements agents, messages and 
interpreters and three phases which are creation, production and dissemination. This 
conceptual framework is very useful especially for tech-oriented approaches to map the 
correct tools with the correct elements or phases. In the last chapter they refer to 35 
recommendations for all involved stakeholders the same identified in previous works.  
Those include among other, suggestions for algorithmic transparency, data availability for 
initiatives, elimination of financial incentives, metadata provision to trusted partners, 
solution for filter bubbles, source debunking, regulation for ad networks, building on 
information literacy emphasizing on collaborative work. This is believed to be a solid work 
on which many future initiatives were built upon.  
 
Five months later the report of High Level Group of Experts (HLEG) was published. The 
report examines potential options to tackle online disinformation. Starting by the 
definition of the phenomenon and analyzing measures already in place by various actors 
its aim is to establish those key principles and objectives that will guide an EU strategy. 
The advice of this report is based on five pillars which set the basis for the creation of the 
EU Code of practice. Transparency of the information ecosystem, promotion of media 
literacy approaches, tools development for users and journalists, shield of media diversity 
and continuous monitoring and reporting the impact of disinformation in Europe. [45] 
 
Only 8 days after the HLEG report was published, Google announced its Google News 
Initiative to fight fake news and support journalism. The ambitious project is said to be 
focused on three goals, empowering quality journalism, supporting sustainable business 
models, supporting newsrooms through technological innovation. [5] (Figure 25) The 
company also announced that it would spend $300 million the next three years on related 
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projects. A partnership with the Harvard Kennedy School’s First Draft was also announced 
in order to launch a Disinfo Lab, which will use tools to combat disinformation elections 
and breaking news moments. [81] They also announced a feature called “Subscribe With 
Google” that will make easier the subscription process to guide readers to consume 
publishers’ journalism. It seems that the search giant has been put under pressure for its 
role as an enabler of disinformation and for the fact that along with Facebook encounter 
for 73% of digital advertising in the US.  A new project called MediaWise was also 
announced with partners such as the Poynter Institute, Stanford University and the Local 
Media Association to improve digital information literacy for young consumers.  [5] 
 
It is also worth to mention that the company at that time was facing severe scrutiny for 
its role in enabling fake news to propagate online concerning the Las Vegas massacre in 
October 2017. Google surfaced threads from controversial message board site 4Chan as 
people were looking to find out who was behind the shootings, which wrongly named 
Geary Danley as the shooter. The threads appeared on people’s search results. (Figure 
26) [111] 
 
 
Figure 25 Google News Initiative Website PrtScn [81] 
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Figure 26 Google search results scandal - Las Vegas massacre [111] 
 
Following the HLEG report and the results of a Eurobarometer survey the Commission 
issued in April 2018 the Communication "Tackling online disinformation: a European 
approach" where the overarching principles and objectives are set out as well as the 
challenges associated with disinformation online. [21] Offering a more in-depth analysis 
the principles are similar to those in HLEG report and include transparency of information 
along its production and distribution cycle, diversity and credibility of information and 
adoption of inclusive solutions. Commission also communicates with this report specific 
measures that it intends to take such as creation of an independent European network of 
fact-checkers and a secure European online platform on disinformation to support this 
network and researchers and exploiting Horizon 2020 work program to invest on 
emerging technologies that will further change the way information is produced and 
disseminated.  
 
European Broadcasting Union (EBU), an alliance of public service media acknowledging 
the importance of the HLEG report published its own position paper to provide input and 
recommendations by identifying practices, policies and initiatives. [43] Admitting the 
existence of a broader information disorder problem it explains the contribution of public 
service media, proposes measures for the role of online platforms and suggests future 
actions for public authorities. In the measures sections, apart from transparency of 
sources they also suggest transparency of sponsorship, so the users clearly understand 
the financial incentives. It criticizes, based on this, the E-commerce Directive which 
categorizes the digital intermediaries and aggregators as providers of “information 
society services”. Instead it claims that such platforms like social media need a clearer 
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regulatory framework that will capture their important role in formatting citizen’s access 
to information.  Concerning algorithmic transparency, they say that users should be given 
the option to consciously change the algorithms to control their newsfeed.  
 
In June 2018 Facebook claimed to be increasing its efforts to fight false news announcing 
some updates on their work. Those included the expansion of their fact-checking program 
to new countries,  tests for fact-checking photos and videos (edited or out of context), 
identifying duplicates of debunked stories, the use of machine learning to help identify 
foreign Pages that could possibly spread hoaxes to people in other countries and 
partnerships with academics like an initiative aiming to provide independent research 
about the role of social media in elections. [120] 
 
Looking at how separate countries have dealt with disinformation, a very good example, 
at least on a reporting and recommendations level, is the one by Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sport Committee, ordered by the House of Commons in UK. [55] Starting by definition 
of fake news, it touches subjects such as data targeting on social media platforms, digital 
literacy and examination of political campaigns closing with recommendations. Triggered 
by the Cambridge Analytical scandal the report is being quite harsh and critical on social 
media platforms.  Two chapters are dedicated in examining online political influence. The 
first, concerning the Russian interference through Facebook in the Brexit referendum, UK 
elections and Catalonia referendum calling for relevant investigation. The second chapter 
investigates the relation of disinformation and manipulation of election campaigns, based 
on the work of SCL elections a private company running campaigns. It is worth to mention 
that the company was an affiliate of Cambridge Analytica firm and they both shut down 
after the scandal. [35] The interim report suggests that tech companies should face legal 
consequences when failing to act against harmful content. It also requests full auditing 
and scrutiny of tech companies including complete algorithm audit, and investigation of 
fake profiles and ad fraud.  The ban of micro targeting especially when it comes to political 
advertising is also a proposed measure. Media literacy is also an important subject and 
they suggest that educational programs should be put in place in schools even for children 
to educate them on how to spot false information for example. The emphasis they give 
on digital literacy is obvious since they place it as a fourth pillar of education along with 
reading, writing and math. They also support on studying how the digital advertising and 
its business model affects the propagation of false information.  A common agreed code 
of ethics for all tech companies that will be developed in cooperation with governments 
and academics and it will be the backbone of the companies referring to it when 
developing new technologies is suggested. It also leaves an open window for regulation 
framework by the UK gov in case companies fail to adhere to this self-regulatory code. 
This aims to tackle the monopoly of tech giants as there are concerns especially with 
regards to the data concertation and their use. Finally, and similar to EBU’s report it 
promotes the creation of a new category to describe those companies (like Facebook) 
which are not exactly platforms not publisher.  [17,55]  
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Last September UNESCO has released a handbook addressed to actors of the media 
system such ass journalism educators, journalists and editors who are interested sharing 
information in the new digital information ecosystem. [18] The handbook titled 
“Journalism, 'Fake News' and Disinformation” is written in a syllabus resembling style with 
7 modules as part of UNESCO’s Journalism Education Series. (Figure 27) Adopting the 
conceptual framework of September 2017 report “Information Disorder” even though it 
is more an educational work it does make interesting points concerning news industry 
transformation, the contribution of digital technologies and social platforms in 
information disorder, media literacy and fact-checking methodology. It is getting more 
practical in module 6 where it sets some critical information verification questions for 
assessing sources and visual content. So overall, we recognize its contribution as an 
educational guide but also a navigation framework in the information disorder, including 
also some useful elements that could be extracted and used in an assessment method of 
future frameworks. 
 
 
Figure 27 UNESCO Journalism, 'Fake News' and Disinformation: A Handbook for Journalism Education [18] 
 
 
 
The most critical milestone all these years ever since “fake news” discussions started, is 
the recently published Code of Practice on Disinformation by the European Commission. 
[48] Developed considering the HLEG report and also all previous steps in the Tackling 
Disinformation framework (Figure 22), the code release in September with its annex is 
the first time that global industry like Facebook, Twitter and Google agree voluntarily, to 
self-regulatory standards in a battle against disinformation. The tech companies and the 
advertising industry presented their own roadmaps to implement with the code. It is 
worth to mention that signatories are not committed to signup for every commitment of 
the code. As specifically defined, they will sign up to those relevant to their products or 
services, their technical capabilities and according to their legal accountability under the 
EU legislation, depending on the role they hold in the creation and dissemination process 
of false content. 
45 
 
Well these conditions defined in the preamble also raises some implications. If we oppose 
different rules to different actors that means that we are fully aware of the role they play, 
and they also accept that role from their side. But we are not that sure that Facebook for 
example who claims to be a social media has accepted its role as an information source 
proved by studies and also its involvement in the information disorder ecosystem. 
 
The business models of the platforms are too complicated and also vague concerning 
their algorithmic operations, as we’ve seen in previous chapter. We are not sure that 
addressing one-dimensional rules work in their case. Any such policy or regulation 
demands that the actors acknowledge their complex digital footprint and the impact they 
have in the new information ecosystem.   
 
 Commission hopes that the Code is an essential step in guaranteeing transparent and 
trustworthy online campaign activities with regards to the European elections in spring 
2019. The Code covers a wide aspect of issues identified in other initiatives also earlier 
like the commitment to distort advertising profits for companies that spread 
disinformation, attack fake accounts and bots, commitment for transparency in political 
advertising, explaining users why they’ve been targeted, empowering users with tools to 
report disinformation, prioritization of authentic and relevant information, 
trustworthiness indicators for content and frameworks to monitor the spread.  
 
A few days after the Code publish, the Sound board of the Forum on Disinformation with 
members from academia, media, fact-checking networks transmitted to Commissioner 
Gabriel their opinion. [72] Their sharp criticism is based on the fact that the code lacks 
common approach, meaningful commitments, the absence of measurables KPI’s that 
would ease accountability and assessment, the absence of compliance and enforcement 
tools and thus no possibility to monitor any implementation process. They suggest 
independent fact-checkers and academic researchers should evaluate the situation in a 
regular basis ahead of the European elections and that the Commission should check 
whether the Code reflects the goals of the “Communication - Tackling online 
disinformation: a European Approach” [115] Concerning the key performance indicators, 
even they are mentioned in the code they take the form of reporting on the measures 
taken on their work on commitments rather than objective and measurable KPI’s. 
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3.3. Synthesis of the above principles and recommendations 
 
 
What we have seen so far are various initiatives to tackle disinformation involving 
suggested actions on behalf of the platforms, the state, the advertising industry, the 
research community, various organizations and the users. The list continues to grow, and 
we should not forget that initiatives from other countries and stakeholders have been 
developed as well which are not part of our study. More or less, the main stakeholders 
are referred in every single project so far and so are some of the main principles which 
are repeated. In the below table we have extracted the main principles, which are based 
on some general cornerstones those of openness, transparency and reporting tools. 
(Figure 28) As categorization criteria, we have chosen the actors from which initiatives 
originate or address to respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28 Initiatives main principles 
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Users are a central entity for every initiative. There is a need for media and digital literacy 
via education programs. Concerning tools that need to be developed users should be able 
to report easily suspicious content and also have the option to alter the personalized 
algorithms controlling their newsfeed, thus contributing to a diversified understanding of 
reality. 
 
Platforms seem to bear most of the burden which is not surprising considering their 
important role discussed extensively in previous chapter. Platforms are urged for 
transparency concerning their funding, sponsorship and political advertising and 
algorithmic transparency. Especially about advertising and its connection with false 
information they are asked to eliminate financial incentives and explain why a specific 
user has been targeted with a specific ad, banning microtargeting.  About the creation 
and spread of content and information quality it is important to provide and prioritize 
diversified and credible information, monitor the spread of malicious content and attack 
fake accounts and bots by tackling computational amplification. Adopting a clear policy 
framework about content regulation which should be published is essential. Finally, as 
cooperation is important, platforms should provide data and metadata to the research 
community, foster collaborative work and be open to auditing and scrutiny procedures. 
 
State’s role is also very important always respecting the delicate balance between control 
and freedom expression rights. Its role should be to promote research and create media 
literacy programs. It should also monitor and report regularly on initiatives and the spread 
of false information. Concerning regulations, it could consider rules for good practices for 
the ad network by requiring transparency for ads. And as we have seen it happening in 
other cases like the General Data Protection regulation, maybe it is also time to examine 
legal consequences and regulatory frameworks. 
 
Media and journalists should also agree on policies and common frameworks and 
cooperate with research community. Of course, they need also tools and it is important 
to debunk sources as well and not only content. Advertising industry’s role is also 
important in reducing programmatic advertising and distorting ad profits for websites 
that promote disinformation. They should also be subject or suggest in cooperation with 
other stakeholders ad network regulations, adopt openness in providing data and 
promote transparency. About technical measures they have not been discussed 
extensively as each platform and stakeholder has its own structure but indicatively those 
may include flags & labelling of false content, false classification technology and solutions 
addressing they very important [phenomenon of filter bubbles. 
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All the above stakeholders form an interdependent network. We have depicted 
schematically the interactions in this network having the users at the center. (Figure 29) 
Green arrows depict input/feedback in the form of providing data and reports while red 
arrows depict initiatives or rules. The yellow arrows from and to the users mean that users 
should be able to interact with every actor in this ecosystem by providing feedback on 
disinformation or adjusting information diet preferences through algorithm transparency. 
At the same time, they should be able to benefit directly from any measure or initiatives 
to which they also provide their feedback. The users’ arrows also represent all media 
literacy actions that should be put in place. We believe it is essential to realize the 
direction of such initiatives and the necessary input and output for each pair of 
interactions in order to guarantee concrete and accountable future actions.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 29 Initiatives - Actors Interaction map 
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Additionally, many of the aforementioned initiatives are political driven especially those 
concerning ad regulations, micro targeting and echo chambers. It is true that political 
reasons are those that have actually triggered the whole disinformation discussion. 
Nevertheless, focusing only on disinformation related to politics encapsulates the danger 
of ignoring other emerging dimensions of disinformation such as in social, scientific and 
commercial related subjects including immigration, medicine and brand safety issues. 
Policies, actions and tools related to political propaganda might need to differ from those 
targeting immigration propaganda and those differences need to be studied also to avoid 
deficiencies.  
 
Considering the global scale of the problem it is quite essential to address it through 
global initiatives. We have the users, the platforms and the content that interact globally, 
the states that interact in a national level or EU, the organizations like IAB that also are at 
local level, the research community which addresses its work globally. So, we see different 
geographical levels of interactions and that could be a problem since the national 
boundaries and local legislation might contradict with the international character of 
digital information journey.  
 
This characteristic is quite unique, a universal network of interactions with global or local 
consequences happening at an unprecedent speed. Every single actor should assist in 
monitoring the digital journey of disinformation and from his own point of view act in 
tackling it, first by being proactive which is essential and then by establishing mechanisms 
and critical control points to minimize impact. At this point there is also the need to set 
some actual metrics and not only quality key performance indicators that will be able to 
prove progress through monitoring and provide ease of comparison and exchange of 
feedback. 
 
The fear of creating fragmented islands of information ecosystems each one with its own 
rules of dealing with information pollution, lacking a global view and perspective is an 
emerging one. Respecting the delicate balance between measures, the right of freedom 
of speech and the local legislations, there should be coordinated initiatives involving all 
identified stakeholders towards a common effort to tackle disinformation globally.  
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Chapter 4 – A systematic literature review of the false information 
taxonomies:  Typology of disinformation 
 
4.1 Introduction - Background 
 
Within all discussions, researches, initiatives and policies there is something really simple 
but absolutely crucial that needs to be clarified, definitions. A unified definition 
framework is a prerequisite especially when setting rules and discussing on legislation and 
measures to be taken to avoid confusion and misperception. Having already argued on 
the ambiguity of the term “fake news” it is essential to share a common understanding of 
the other terms introduced to cover the broad categories but also the different types of 
false information 
Every approach to tackle disinformation should be able to clearly define all different types 
and agree on a common language to avoid fragmentation. In order to grasp the 
complexity of the information disorder problem, we need to agree on a common 
vocabulary. When trying to tackle a multidimensional problem we need to be able to 
clearly define it. In the core of all these approaches is the types of false information. 
Various terms have been used to describe the information pollution problem with most 
common the one of “fake news” that became popular after the US elections. This research 
was triggered by the absence of a commonly agreed taxonomy of false information types. 
Each study adopts its own definitions leading to conflicts or overlaps. 
When suggesting a new taxonomy, it is essential to identify the categorization criteria.  
While some of the reviewed taxonomies referred in some general categorization criteria 
in the broader text, in most of the cases those were not explicitly attributed to each type 
of false information.  Among the challenges we also met, was the use of confusing terms 
for describing ultimately the same criteria. That, in combination with vague and 
overlapping definitions contribute to the creation of silos. At the same time some 
taxonomies suggested types of disinformation that did not have the same level of 
abstraction in their definitions. Thus, a broader category type may be found in the same 
group with a very concrete and narrow definition.   
Conducting a systematic literature review, we will examine the false information 
ecosystem from a theoretical perspective providing an overview of the most relevant 
research contributions around the existing false information types, definitions and 
taxonomies.  
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4.2. Systematic Literature Review   - Research method  
 
We followed a systematic literature review approach based on Kitchenham’s et al. 
methodological guidelines. The research of the articles started in the July 2018 and was 
completed in October 2018. By following this formal method with explicit inclusion and 
exclusion criteria, we intend to provide a replicable research review with minimal bias 
arising from review process itself. The procedure we applied was the following:  
1. Define scope and research questions 
2. Define search terms according to 1 
3. Select our sources [digital libraries]  
4. Application of search term on selected sources 
5. Selection of primary studies by application of inclusion and exclusion criteria on 
search results 
Scope and Research questions 
The main goal of this survey was to identify the existing taxonomies and typologies of 
false information categories published in literature. That means that first we had to make 
an extensive review of the taxonomies published. Triggered by the absence of a 
commonly agreed categorization, our next ambition was to examine if we could compare 
and combine those results, applying our own exclusion/inclusion criteria and suggest our 
own typology following a robust methodology based on logical questions and steps. 
Our approach consists of two parts. The first part is to collect all types of false information 
and after applying some pre-processing logical rules, introduce our own typology of 
disinformation types providing also a relevant glossary. During our research, we 
encountered additional types of false information that were found in the literature but 
were not under a taxonomy framework. We decided to expand our search and review the 
literature out of the framework of taxonomical models, extending our typology with 
additional types of false information having as an ultimate goal to further enrich our 
model. Towards the same direction we considered necessary to conduct an additional 
research on the internet to cover important material such as national research studies, 
and university initiatives that did not belong to the main libraries. 
 
Having concluded to a typology and in order to strengthen our work, we decided to define 
some categorization criteria referred to as dimensions, which could be assigned to our 
types of disinformation providing our own schema. Thus, our goal was to identify, and 
review categorization criteria of false information taxonomies used in the literature, 
select our own dimensions and assign values to each type of our disinformation typology 
through a mapping system based on our glossary. This is the second part of our approach. 
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Our research questions may be summarized as follows: 
1) What are the existing taxonomies / typologies for false information categorization?  
2) Can we consolidate the taxonomies in our own schema and suggest a typology? 
3) What are the categorization criteria for the identified taxonomies and can we propose 
our own and combine those dimensions with our typology? 
 
Literature review results  
An automatic searching was based on six main sources of scientific databases in order to 
receive the largest spectrum possible of all relevant publications. Namely:  
-ACM Digital Library  
- IEEE Xplore Digital Library 
- Science Direct 
-SpringerLink 
- Google Scholar  
- Scopus 
 
Based on the research questions, we led out some pilot searches in order to obtain a list 
of initial studies. The latter where then used as basis for the systematic review in order to 
find the search terms which would best answer our research questions. The following are 
the search terms along with synonyms used in this systematic review:  
1. “fake news” 
2. “false information” 
3. “disinformation” 
4. Taxonomy OR typology OR classification 
5. Categories OR categorization 
6. Types of fake news / false information / disinformation 
All the search terms were combined by using the “AND” / “OR” Boolean operators 
depending on the advanced search format of each library. This made the query more 
flexible to use in different electronic library search tools. In addition, we used “OR” 
Boolean operator in order to include synonyms of our keywords and find more relevant 
results. Where that was possible, we focused on title and abstract as we were looking for 
papers that dealt with this topic.  For Google Scholar we had to apply more strict search 
criteria such as focusing on title as the results were quite high in volume and repeated. 
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Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
The following inclusion and exclusion criteria were defined in order to find the papers on 
which we base our research: 
CR1: We excluded papers that studied the fake news categories from a very technical 
perspective 
CR2: We included only papers written in English 
CR3: We excluded publications that mentioned arbitrary some types of false information  
 
In Figure 30 we can see the Primary studies selection which are actually the results of our 
initial search conducted in the libraries. Starting with 1102 records and after removing 
duplicates, we scanned the title of 802 records, abstract of 160 and we concluded to 70 
legitimate for full text scanning. From those 8 were able to answer our research 
questions.  
 
 
Figure 30 Primary studies selection 
 
 
After carefully studying our list of primary studies including the citations, we have decided 
to conduct an additional research on the internet to extend our typology with types of 
false information that might have not been identified in the primary studies. Our aim was 
to cover important recent material such as national research studies and university 
initiatives that did not belong to the main libraries. Those additional sources are depicted 
in the Prisma diagram following. 
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In the below Prisma diagram (Figure 31) we can see the flow of information through the 
different phases (Identification, Screening and Eligibility) and the exclusion reasons. The 
difference with the Primary studies selection schema is that it maps out the number of 
records identified by other sources as well, apart from those initially found through 
database searching. The additional 15 records that were identified through a survey 
process on the internet as described earlier and the total search results are depicted. 
 
PRISMA Flow Diagram – Primary and additional records selection 
 
 
 
Figure 31 PRISMA diagram  - Primary and additional records selection 
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4.3 SLR Results  
 
Data extraction 
The data we extracted from our primary and additional studies were guided by our research questions. Our first goal was to identify existing taxonomies 
and typologies of false information found in the literature. In Table 1 we have gathered all the taxonomies where each column corresponds to one taxonomy 
from the 10 total records of our research. The following section includes detailed review of the identified taxonomies. 
   
Taxonomies / Typologies of false information types 
 
 
19 38 119 64 116 112  55 101 23 110 
Satire News satire 
 
Falsehood to affect 
election results 
 
Fabrication 
Misinformatio
n 
Fabricated content  Fabrication Satire 
Commerciall
y sensational 
content  
Visual based 
False 
connection 
News parody 
Falsehood for profit 
gain 
Manipulation 
Disinformatio
n 
Propaganda  
Manipulat
ed content 
Misleading content 
Nation-state 
sponsored 
misinformati
on 
  
User based 
Misleading 
content 
Fabrication Bad Journalism Misappropriation 
Opinion 
based 
Imposter  
Imposter 
content 
Sloppy reporting 
Highly-
partisan 
news sites 
Post based 
False context Manipulation Parody Propaganda Fact based 
 
Conspiracy Theories 
 
 
 
Misleading 
content 
Conspiracy 
theories 
Social media Network based 
Imposter 
content 
Advertising 
 
Ideologically opposed 
news 
 
Satire  Hoaxes  
False 
context of 
connection  
Intentionally 
deceptive 
Satire or 
Parody 
Knowledge based 
Manipulated 
content 
Propaganda 
News that challenges 
orthodox authority 
Parody  Hyperpartisan  Satire   Stance based 
 
Fabricated 
content 
 
 
  Advertising  Fallacy  Deep fakes    
     
 
Rumors 
 
 
     
     
 
Clickbait 
     
     
 
Satire 
     
Table 1 Taxonomies table from primary and additional studies 
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In chapter 1, we’ve seen how the term fake news became popular and served ever since 
2016 as an umbrella term creating confusion. We have also argued on the deficiency of 
the term itself by definition to cover all different types of false information that may 
appear online.  
 
One of the first approaches to give structure to the information disorder ecosystem, was 
by Wardle & Derekshan in 2017 [19] in a report published by the Council of Europe as a 
response to growing concerns of member states for the implications of disinformation 
campaigns. They presented the conceptual framework for examining “information 
disorder” identifying three different hypergroups of false information categories. (Figure 
32) They selected their groups based on how false and harmful types of false information 
is. The first is “misinformation” when false information is shared, but no harm is meant, 
the second “disinformation” is when false information is shared with the intention to 
cause harm and finally “mal-information” is when genuine information is shared to cause 
harm, often by moving information designed to stay private into the public sphere. Under 
the misinformation category they place misleading content and false connection. The 
disinformation is the richest hypergroup containing false context, misleading content, 
imposter content and fabricated content and mal-information includes some leaks, 
harassment or hate speech. They also include satire and parody without stating in which 
broad category those belong.   
 
 
Figure 32 Information Disorder Hypergroups and Types [19] 
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The importance of the introduction of these 3 hypergroups may be recognized taking into 
account that in the HLEG report by European Commission [45] the word disinformation is 
favored over fake news. The definition is further enriched to include inaccurate and 
misleading information apart from false designed to intentionally cause harm or for profit.   
 
Edson C. Tandoc et.al. [2017] [38] examined 34 academic articles that used the term ‘fake 
news” from 2003. They came up with six different types of fake news which are: satire, 
parody, fabrication, manipulation, propaganda, and advertising. One commonality among 
these types is how they all imitate the look and feel of real news. Trying to map those 
types in a model the authors consider two dimensions: facticity as -the degree to which 
fake news relies on facts- and intention to deceive -the degree to which the creator of 
fake news intends to mislead, measured on a scale from high to low. In the below figure 
we can see how four general types are created based on the levels of facticity and 
intention to deceive. (Figure 33) 
 
 
Figure 33 Typology of fake news [38] 
LSE Media Policy Project published a report on public policy responses on fake news. [119] 
Even though they agree on the ambiguity and misuse of the “fake news” term they do not 
suggest a new term. Instead they proceed with suggesting six different types of fake news 
including:  falsehood knowingly distributed to undermine candidate or election, 
falsehood distributed for financial gain, parody, bad journalism/ unsubstantiated rumor, 
news that is ideologically opposed and news that challenges orthodox authority. (Figure 
34) Unlike previous works they do not define categorization criteria like facticity or 
intention to harm. Their categories actually describe a variety of sociopolitical 
phenomena from alleged foreign interference in domestic elections to any view that 
challenges consensus ‘group think’. The suggested types seem to be more descriptive and 
content oriented. 
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Figure 34 LSE Media Policy Project - The 6 fake news types [119] 
 
In a report from Lund University ordered by Swedish administrative authority [64], the 
information influence activities are studied. Starting by analyzing different dimensions 
and strategies and moving on with meaning, context and narrative of different influence 
activities this very detailed analysis leads beautifully in the discussion of fake news as part 
of the influence techniques. They also favor the disinformation term over “fake news” 
and distinguish seven categories of disinformation: fabrication, manipulation, 
misappropriation, propaganda, satire, parody and advertising. Trying to discern their 
categorization criteria we can see that those are the intention to misinform / deceive / 
harm, the factual base of a statement and the entertaining character of the content. Even 
though their list of disinformation types is more or less similar to others their unique 
contribution is focused rather on the fact that they try to analyze the structure of 
disinformation. According to the writers, disinformation is generally employed using two 
approaches. The first is the constructive approach where new or alternative narratives 
are constructed, or certain parts of true stories are replaced with false ones to support 
existing narratives. This technique may be hard to spot as the manipulation maybe minor. 
The other is the destructive approach where noise is injected with volumes of unreliable 
information as such to be difficult to discern the original information. 
In an effort to study disinformation on the web and social media and especially its 
characteristics, detection mechanisms, impact and rationale, Kumar and Shah [116] are 
using “false information” as a new umbrella term but they only focus on three generic 
types of false information. Fake reviews, hoaxes on collaborative platforms, and fake 
news in social media. Even though they agree with the definitions of dis- and 
misinformation as seen before, using as categorization criteria the intent and knowledge 
they provide a rather ambiguous taxonomy consisting of four general categories as seen 
in Figure 35. So false information based on the intent to mislead or not the user, it may 
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be disinformation or misinformation. And according to the existence of knowledge, which 
is interpreted as factual base to our understanding, false information may be “fact-based” 
or “opinion-based”.  More detailed types of false information are given as examples, but 
this model doesn’t seem adequate to classify types that we’ve seen before. Maybe this is 
due to the narrow focus of the writers in specific domains. Another paradox is that it 
places disinformation and misinformation at the lower level, whereas in other works 
those are presented as higher-level categorization or even umbrella terms in some cases.  
 
Figure 35 Categorization of false information based on Intent & Knowledge [116] 
 
The term “false information” was also adopted by Savvas Zannettou, et.al [2018] [112]. 
Their suggested taxonomy includes 10 types of false information categorized in three 
groups based on their severity. As severity is defined how misleading and hurtful those 
are for the recipients.  The first group and most severe is called “fake news” including 
fabrication, propaganda, imposter content and conspiracy theories.   Well creating a 
hypergroup with the ambiguous name “fake news” is not such a wise approach.  The 
second is biased/inaccurate news including hoaxes, hyperpartisan and fallacy. The last 
group without serious consequences is misleading or ambiguous news and here they 
place rumors, clickbait and satire news. If we tried to insert in this taxonomy the facticity 
factor, we could say that in the first group there is probably complete absence of factual 
information whereas in the stories that are part of the second group they incorporate the 
truth to some extent, so there is a mixture of facts.  
In a report by Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ordered by the House of 
Commons, [55] the lower house of the Parliament of the United Kingdom seven types of 
false information are identified. Those are fabricated content, manipulated content, 
imposter content, misleading content, false context of connection, satire & parody and 
deep fakes. The rationale behind the selection of those types is not defined. Concerning 
the “fake news” term, they urge the UK government to reject it and use instead the 
agreed definitions of ‘misinformation’ and ‘disinformation’. 
According to Nicola Watts who is studying fake news from a brand safety perspective, in 
an article published by Singapore Management University [101], there are five categories 
of “fake news”. For this taxonomy truthfulness and the intention to deceive are taken as 
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criteria and the types are: satire or parody, misleading news, sloppy reporting, conspiracy 
theories and intentionally deceptive news. A misuse of the terms disinformation and 
misinformation is reported here, where disinformation is characterized as something 
completely fake whereas misinformation arises from human error or bias.  
Mali Lewis and Coral Luck [2018] [23] from RiceMedia UK used Collin’s Dictionary Word 
of the year [2017] to define fake news as false, often sensational, information 
disseminated under the guise of news reporting.  Studying the impact of fake news on 
SEO and digital marketing they identified five types of fake news including commercially 
driven sensational content, nation-state sponsored misinformation, highly-partisan news 
sites, social media itself, satire or parody. The fact that they suggest a category for social 
media as fake news type might sound odd, but they include in this category links of fake 
news that propagate inside the social media. That’s an interesting point but we think it 
rather makes sense from a technical point of view for example when studying 
dissemination mechanisms of disinformation, but it is not useful for a taxonomy. 
One of the most diverse taxonomies appears in a paper by Shivam et Al [2018] [110].  
Their categorization takes into consideration the content type of a news stories. Without 
rejecting the term fake news, they define it as untruthful content that is created in order 
to convince the recipients for its truthfulness. The suggested types are: visual-based, user-
based, post-based, network-based, knowledge-based, style-based and stance-based. For 
example, as post-based they define the kind of false information that mainly appear in 
social media so this is a category like that of RiceMedia [23]. We believe that this 
taxonomy fails to include all the different types already appeared in bibliography and the 
categories themselves give little understanding on the content.
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4.4 Our approach  
 
4.4.1 Part 1 – Creating a disinformation typology 
 
One of our research questions was to consolidate the taxonomies in our own schema and 
suggest a typology of false information types. In order to suggest a typology, we had to 
study carefully all the above taxonomies of Table 1. The first logical step was to gather all 
different types of false information from the taxonomies in one list. Our goal was to 
normalize the various types, detect commonalities and overlapping, exclude types that 
did not offer uniqueness and combine others under more comprehensive group names. 
Following this bottom up strategy will allow for a safe and fair result. For the validity of 
this step the creation of a common glossary where we can refer to was considered 
necessary. The glossary is presented in Appendix.  
Before moving with the data preprocessing of the false information types, we are taking 
a closer look at the taxonomies table. We observe many commonalities and some strong 
differentiations among both taxonomies and the types separately. We decided to reject 
three of those models for the below reasons: 
1. In [119], the writers failed to define categorization which weakens the taxonomy 
validity. Additionally, as already mentioned their categories actually describe a 
variety of sociopolitical phenomena so the suggested types seem to be more 
descriptive and content oriented.  
2.  Srijan Kumar and Neil Shah  [116] introduced promising but vague categories and 
definitions without emphasizing on normalized subtypes of false information. This 
model seems inadequate to classify various types maybe this is due to the narrow 
focus of the writers in specific domains. Another paradox is that it places 
disinformation and misinformation at the lower level, whereas in other works 
those are presented as higher-level categorization or even umbrella terms in some 
cases. 
3. One of the most diverse taxonomies is that of Shivam et Al [110] which cannot be 
easily compared to others. We believe that this taxonomy fails to categorize all 
the different types already appeared in bibliography and the categories 
themselves give little understanding on the content. 
The below Table 2 depicts the data cleaning process. In the first column, we have all the 
false information types. After a thorough analysis and the removal of repetitions we 
managed to list 22 unique terms derived exclusively from the 8 selected taxonomies. To 
have a holistic view of this spectrum we reviewed the literature out of the framework of 
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taxonomical models, so we extended our list with 20 more types of false information 
found in notable sources [31], [41], [131]. Those types were not under a taxonomy model 
but since they were published as false information types and their number is almost equal 
to the types from the taxonomies, we wished to enrich our initial catalogue to further 
strengthen our model. From these additional 20 types, three of them were kept up to the 
last stage proving that it was a wise thought to encounter them. 
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UNIQUE TYPES FROM TAXONOMIES  PREPROCESS SUGGESTED 
Clickbait Clickbait Clickbait 
Conspiracy Theories Conspiracy Theories Conspiracy Theories 
Deep fakes Rule A 
 
Fabrication Fabrication Fabrication 
Fallacy Fallacy 
 
False connection Rule D Misleading connection 
False context  Rule D 
 
Hoax Hoax Hoax 
Hyperpartisan Hyperpartisan Hyperpartisan 
Imposter Imposter Imposter 
Intentionally deceptive  Rule A 
 
Manipulation Rule A 
 
Misappropriation Rule B [Similar to Manipulation] 
 
Misleading content Rule D 
 
Parody Parody 
 
Highly-partisan news sites Rule B [Similar to Hyperpartisan] 
 
Propaganda Propaganda 
 
Rumors Rumors Rumors 
Satire  Satire  
 
Sloppy reporting Rule A [confusing similar to partisan] 
 
Social media Rule C [social media is a distribution 
channel of false information and not a 
category type.] 
 
Advertising Rule C [advertising is not a false information 
type, clickbait is] 
 
ADDITIONAL TYPES FROM 
LITERATURE [21] 
  
 
Bogus Rule A 
 
Bullying Rule C 
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Data pre-processing 
Having our initial list of 42 different false information types we had to configure some 
logical rules that would allow us to process this list by establishing inclusion and exclusion 
criteria that will provide a solid methodology. Moving from column 1 to column 2 we had 
to follow some logical steps, adopting rejection criteria and integration of types where 
needed.  As our approach is theoretical, we had to review the types from a user/recipient 
perspective with a common understanding and avoid too narrow, too broad, confusing 
or technical definitions that wouldn’t contribute to a clear categorization. The rules that 
we formed and followed were: 
Defamation Rule C 
 
Disinformatzya Rule C 
 
Doxing Rule A 
 
Error Rule A 
 
Fake Reviews Fake Reviews Fake Reviews 
False Balance Rule B  
 
Forgeries Rule C 
 
Hate speech Rule C   
Harassement Rule C   
Leaks  Rule C   
Lie Rule C 
 
Lying by omission Rule A 
 
Manufactured Amplification Rule A 
 
Pseudoscience Pseudoscience Pseudoscience 
Shitposting Rule A 
 
Trolling Trolling Trolling 
Typosquating Rule A 
 
Urban Legend Urban Legend 
 
Table 2 False information types - Data cleaning process 
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• Rule A: Removal of generic and confusing types / definitions [ie “intentionally 
deceptive” or “sloppy reporting”] or too technical [ie deep fakes] or too narrow 
• Rule B: Removal of duplicates by synonyms detection and avoid terms repetitions 
and overlapping. [same meaning different names] 
• Rule C: Removal of terms that were incorrectly categorized as types of fake news 
[e.g. social media or illegal types covered by national laws].  
• Rule D: Integration of terms and creation of normalized hypergroups 
One example of integration is the new type “misleading connection” that came from 
integrating the types false connection, false context and misleading content. Thus, in the 
second column we have the remaining 15 types after applying the four logical rules.  
For the final selection of the types that would be part of our typology, we decided to 
proceed only with those types of false information that fall under the disinformation 
definition provided by the independent High- Level Expert Group in the EU Report of 2018 
[45].  According to this definition, disinformation "includes all forms of false, inaccurate, 
or misleading information designed, presented and promoted to intentionally cause 
public harm or for profit". The report excludes types that do not have the intent to 
deceive, described as not misleading like satire or parody and also others forms of illegal 
content like hate speech and defamation that are subject to EU or national laws. So, the 
last column includes the final eleven normalized types that constitute our disinformation 
typology, definitions of which may be found in the appendix. In the below Figure 36 we 
can see a schematic representation of the steps described above. 
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Figure 36 Types of false information - Preprocessing schema 
 
 
The first part of our approach has just been completed. We have mapped all false 
information types that we encountered in our search, and after applying some logical 
steps we concluded with a list of eleven disinformation types that form our typology. For 
our typology we have also developed a glossary of definitions which is considered an 
integral part of our work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67 
 
4.4.2 Part 2 Combining categorization criteria with the typology 
 
The second part of our approach answers the third research question.  
“What are the categorization criteria for the identified taxonomies and can we propose 
our own and combine those dimensions with our typology?” 
It is essential to understand the rationale behind each categorization model, what was 
the reason of selecting each type and how these types form a taxonomy. When 
introducing a new taxonomy, the reader should be able to clearly understand each type, 
what are the differences between types and how selection criteria were defined. Being 
able to adequately justify any taxonomical approach attaches great importance to any 
form of categorization and allows future classification of new types without creating 
confusion. 
So for the second part, it is essential to start by reviewing what criteria do the existing 
taxonomies deploy.  Thus, we needed to identify and extract the categorization criteria 
from each study.  While some taxonomies referred in some general categorization criteria 
in the broader text, in most of the cases those were not explicitly attributed to each type 
of false information. In other cases, the taxonomies seemed to have been developed 
without following any rules.   After reviewing general categorization criteria of false 
information used in the literature, we select our own dimensions and assign values to 
each type of our disinformation typology through a mapping system based on our 
glossary. 
The following section describes the reviewing process, the selection of dimensions and 
provides a mapping table of selected dimensions with our disinformation typology. 
 
Making an overview of the basic parameters of false information those appear to be the 
motivation, the level of facticity, the impact and the verifiability. Using the basic 
communication model as an example for disinformation we have the agent the message 
(disinformation type) and the recipient. So, starting from the agent, understanding the 
motives is an important element. Motives may be economic, political or ideological to 
promote ideas or even to just cause confusion [101]. Economic motive is usually 
associated with adverting revenue and clickbait and is one of the most often.  [45,38,119] 
The goal of spreading and creating false information might be either to promote or to 
discredit ideas, attract audience and affect public opinion. [64]  
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Motives might be to promote or discredit ideas/ attract audience & increase sales/ affect 
public opinion. As motives might be overlapping it is essential to discern the primary 
purpose [64,38].  Even the fake news definition is guided by the intention dimension, so 
its role is important in deciding what is fake as the underling intent provides both 
theoretical and practical value.  [38,75] 
One of the many reasons the term fake news is rejected by the majority of writers is 
because of the word fake itself. The level of facticity is an important aspect of false 
information defined as the degree to which fake news rely on facts [38]. That degree may 
vary from completely false [fabricated] to a mixture of facts and false context or 
narratives or distortion of information or images.  [45,119] The dimension of falseness 
discerns different groups in [19], also called factual base [64] the absence of which makes 
the verification difficult [38] In some cases facticity is blended with accuracy [119,55] but 
we are keeping the facility dimension as the most widely accepted. The underlying 
techniques of adjusting facticity might be taking facts out of context or being highly 
selective with facts. [64] There is an interesting differentiation between opinion based 
false information where there is no absolute ground truth and fact based where there is 
a single based ground truth information which is fabricated or contradicted. [116] 
Searching how facticity might interact with impact or severity in an interesting study 
grouping false information types the most severe group contains totally or mostly 
fictional information where verifiability is difficult [like conspiracy theories] and the less 
severe group incorporates the truth to some extent. [112] Now concerning the impact, as 
this has to do with the consequences of dissemination of false information and not with 
the information item itself, it is generally accepted that impact may be high measured 
with real world consequences or through engagement and other metrics on the web. 
[116] 
Based on the above we have decided to proceed with three dimensions in order to map 
the disinformation types. (Table 3) The mapping procedure was guided by the 
disinformation definitions of our glossary. (See Appendix)  
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About the motivation our selection was rather easy, so our qualitative scale includes 
financial, ideological or psychological motives. Political motives are included in the 
ideological. We decided to include a fourth potential value for motive and that is 
“unclear”. We considered that necessary to cover cases where the primary motive may 
be unclear like in the case of fabrication. 
For the Facticity dimension we chose a continuum based on a six-labeled rating system 
used by Politifact the Truth-O-Meter ratings. [9] We are using three labels [Mostly True, 
Mostly False, False] in accordance to the levels of facticity described earlier which we 
define as:  
• Mostly true – The statement or parts of it are accurate and contains some facts 
but needs clarification or additional information. 
• Mostly false – The statement contains an element of truth but ignores critical 
facts that would give a different impression. 
• False – The statement is not accurate. 
 
Exploring the verifiability of disinformation content, a binary procedure was performed. 
We used trusted flaggers [Yes/No] as classifier answering the question “Is the message 
easily verifiable?”. 
Our mapping system is presented on Table 4. The suggested disinformation types from 
part 1 were combined with the selected dimensions and labelled according to their 
definitions. 
Suggested Dimensions Values 
Motivation Financial – Ideological – Psychological-Unclear 
Facticity Mostly True - Mostly False - False 
Verifiability Yes -No 
Table 3 Suggested dimensions 
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The fact that a particular type of disinformation can fit into more than one values of a 
dimension is an indication of the complexity of our problem. Ideally for a classification 
system each type should take one value, defining orthogonal dimensions, but 
disinformation does not allow mathematical treatment at least when studied from a 
theoretical perspective.  Definitions are not strict, and flexibility sometimes is the key to 
grasp the complexity.  
 
4.5 Summary and conclusions 
 
Our work may be considered as a starting point for clarifying the various definitions and 
investigate the broad aspect behind the ambiguous “fake news” term, by identifying 
various false information types.  We also believe that it constitutes a small contribution 
from an educational aspect, providing users with a coherent typology presenting different 
dimensions of the disinformation problem. We emphasize on the importance of 
definitions and the danger of placing everything under one generic and ambiguous term, 
since any type might demand different treatment.  
In this context the mapping procedure we followed allows for a further in-depth 
investigation of false information not only in terms of content, but by studying other 
important parameters like motives, facticity and verifiability that we encountered. 
Acknowledging the complexity of information disorder problem, we consider these 
dimensions equally important and we believe that they will allow a more focused study 
in the future. We also believe that our framework could be useful for a compliance 
Table 4 Disinformation types mapping table 
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assessment procedure for a certification based on standards where clear definitions and 
common language is essential.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
Citations 
 
1            Alberto Nardelli, Craig Silverman. 2017. One Of The Biggest Alternative Media Networks In Italy Is 
Spreading Anti-Immigrant News And Misinformation On Facebook. Buzzfeed News. 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertonardelli/one-of-the-biggest-alternative-media-networks-in-italy-is" 
2 Adam Mosseri, VP, News Feed. 2017. Working to Stop Misinformation and False News. Facebook 
for Media (April 2017) https://www.facebook.com/facebookmedia/blog/working-to-stop-misinformation-
and-false-news 
3 Alex Hern. 2018. Facebook enables 'fake news' by reliance on digital advertising – report. (January 
2018). https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/31/facebook-fake-news-disinformation-
digital-advertising-report-news-feed 
4 Alexios Mantzarlis. 2017. Fact-checkers around the world agree on shared code of principles. 
(March 2017). https://www.poynter.org/news/fact-checkers-around-world-agree-shared-code-principles 
5 Alyssa Newcomb. 2018. Google embraces the news with new initiative to fight misinformation. 
NBC news. (March 2018) https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/google-embraces-news-new-
initiative-fight-misinformation-n858236 
6 Amanda Robb. 2018. Pizzagate: Anatomy of a Fake News Scandal. (June 2018). 
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/anatomy-of-a-fake-news-scandal-125877/ 
7 Amy Forni. 2017. Data and Analytics Empower Modern Marketers. (March 2017). 
https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/data-and-analytics-empower-modern-marketers/ 
8 Andrew Guess and Brendan Nyhan. 2018. Selective Exposure to Misinformation: Evidence from 
the consumption of fake news during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign. (January 2018). 
https://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/fake-news-2016.pdf 
9 Angie Drobnic Holan. 2018. The Principles of the Truth-O-Meter: PolitiFact’s methodology for 
independent fact-checking. Politifact . https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/article/2018/feb/12/principles-truth-o-meter-politifacts-methodology-i/ 
10 Anon. 2016. Programmatic ads to grow 31% in 2017, ahead of all other channels – Zenith. 
(November 2016). https://www.zenithmedia.com/%EF%BB%BF%EF%BB%BF%EF%BB%BFprogrammatic-
ads-grow-31-2017-ahead-channels/ 
11 Anon. 2017. Facebook News Feed Algorithm History | 2018 Update. (December 2017). 
https://wallaroomedia.com/facebook-newsfeed-algorithm-history/ 
12 Anon. Addressing Hoaxes and Fake News. https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/12/news-feed-
fyi-addressing-hoaxes-and-fake-news/ https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/12/news-feed-fyi-
addressing-hoaxes-and-fake-news/ 
13 Ansgar Koene et al. 2017. Editorial responsibilities arising from personalization algorithms. ORBIT 
Journal 1, 1 (2017). DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.29297/orbit.v1i1.26 
14 BBC. “Facebook Ditches Fake News Warning Flag.” BBC News, BBC, 21 Dec. 2017, 
www.bbc.com/news/technology-42438750. 
73 
 
15 Bertin Martens, Luis Aguiar, Estrella Ggmez, and Frank Mueller-Langer. 2018. The Digital 
Transformation of News Media and the Rise of Disinformation and Fake News. JRC Digital Economy Working 
Paper 2018-02 (2018). DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3164170 
16 Callum Borchers. 2018. How Hillary Clinton might have inspired Trump's 'fake news' attacks. The 
Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/01/03/how-hillary-clinton-
might-have-inspired-trumps-fake-news-attacks/?utm_term=.2e78a933e0e7 
17 Carole Cadwalladr. 2018. A withering verdict: MPs report on Zuckerberg, Russia and Cambridge 
Analytica. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jul/28/dcms-report-fake-news-
disinformation-brexit-facebook-russia 
18 Cherilyn Ireton and Julie Posetti. 2018. Journalism, ‘Fake News’ & Disinformation Handbook for 
Journalism Education and Training. UNESCO 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0026/002655/265552e.pdf 
19 Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan.2017 INFORMATION DISORDER: Toward an 
interdisciplinary framework for research and policy making (September 2017) Council of Europe report 
DGI(2017)09. In Hossein Derakhshan, ed. 
20 Claire Wardle. 2018 .Information Disorder: The Essential Glossary . Harvard Kennedy School. First 
Draft News. https://firstdraftnews.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/infoDisorder_glossary.pdf 
21 Communication - Tackling online disinformation: a European Approach. 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communication-tackling-online-disinformation-
european-approach 
22 Constine, Josh. “Facebook Now Flags and down-Ranks Fake News with Help from Outside Fact 
Checkers.” TechCrunch, TechCrunch, 15 Dec. 2016, techcrunch.com/2016/12/15/facebook-now-flags-and-
down-ranks-fake-news-with-help-from-outside-fact-checkers/. 
23 Coral Luck. 2018. Fake News and its Impact on SEO and Digital Marketing – ManyMinds Give It A 
Go. Ricemedia. https://www.ricemedia.co.uk/blog/fake-news-impact-seo-digital-marketing-manyminds-
give-go/ 
24 Craig Silverman. 2016. How Teens In The Balkans Are Duping Trump Supporters With Fake News. 
(November 2016). Retrieved December 7, 2018 from 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/how-macedonia-became-a-global-hub-for-pro-
trump-misinfo 
25 Craig Silverman. 2016. This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories Outperformed 
Real News On Facebook.Buzzfeed news.  https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/viral-
fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook 
26 D.j. Flynn, Brendan Nyhan, and Jason Reifler. 2017. The Nature and Origins of Misperceptions: 
Understanding False and Unsupported Beliefs About Politics. Political Psychology 38 (2017), 127–150. 
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/pops.12394 
27 Damian Tambini. 2017. How advertising fuels fake news. (April 2017). 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2017/02/24/how-advertising-fuels-fake-news/ 
28 Daniel Funke. 2018. A guide to anti-misinformation actions around the world. Poynter 
https://www.poynter.org/news/guide-anti-misinformation-actions-around-world 
74 
 
29 Daniel Jolley and Karen Douglas. 2014. The Effects of Anti-Vaccine Conspiracy Theories on 
Vaccination Intentions. PLoS ONE 9, 2 (2014). DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0089177 
30 David Anderson. 2015. Attention as a Limited Capacity Resource. (2015). 
https://www.columbia.edu/ 
31 David Kirkpatrick and Chantal Tode. 2017. Study: 31% of programmatic advertisers will reduce 
spend over fake news. (June 2017). https://bit.ly/2zqCMek 
32 David Kirkpatrick. 2017. Study: 31% of programmatic advertisers will reduce spend over fake 
news.Marketing Drive. https://www.marketingdive.com/news/study-31-of-programmatic-advertisers-will-
reduce-spend-over-fake-news/443962/ 
33 Dom Phillips. 2018. Brazil battles fake news 'tsunami' amid polarized presidential election.The 
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/10/brazil-fake-news-presidential-election-
whatsapp-facebook 
34 Donald Trump. 2017. Tweet about fake news. 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/818990655418617856?lang=el 
35 Dustin Volz . 2018. Cambridge Analytica and British parent shut down after Facebook scandal. 
Reuters (May 2018) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-privacy/cambridge-analytica-and-
british-parent-shut-down-after-facebook-scandal-idUSKBN1I32L7 
36 E. Bakshy, S. Messing, and L.A. Adamic. 2015. Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion 
on Facebook. Science 348, 6239 (2015), 1130–1132. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.aaa1160 
37 Edda Humprecht. 2018.  Where ‘fake news’ flourishes: a comparison across four Western 
democracies,Information, Communication & Society, DOI: 10.1080/1369118X.2018.1474241 
38 Edson C. Tandoc Jr., Zheng Wei Lim & Richard Ling. 2018. Defining “Fake News”, Digital Journalism, 
6:2, 137-153, DOI: 10.1080/21670811.2017.1360143 
39 Eli Pariser. 2012. The filter bubble: how the new personalized Web is changing what we read and 
how we think. Choice Reviews Online 50, 02 (2012). DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.5860/choice.50-0926 
40 Erik Huberman. 2018. Programmatic Advertising Failed to Meet Expectations. 
https://www.adweek.com/brand-marketing/programmatic-advertising-failed-to-meet-expectations/ 
41 EU vs DISINFORMATION. https://euvsdisinfo.eu/ 
42 Euractiv. 2018. Special Report Vaccination raising awareness against fake news. 
https://en.euractiv.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/special-report/EURACTIV-Special-Report-Vaccination-
Raising-awareness-against-fake-news.pdf 
43 European Broadcasting Union and EBU. 2018. 'Fake News' and the Information Disorder. (April 
2018). https://www.ebu.ch/publications/fake-news-and-the-information-disorder 
44 European Commission - Fact Sheet MEMO Tackling online disinformation Brussels, 26 April 2018  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-3371_en.htm 
45 European Commission Directorate-General for Communication Networks, Content and 
Technology. 2018 A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation Report of the independent High level 
Group on fake news and online disinformation, March 2018 
75 
 
46 European Commission. 2014 Platform Neutrality Building an open and sustainable digital 
environment MAY 2014. 1 Opinion no. 2014-2 of the French Digital Council on platform neutrality. 2 
Introduction ... Platform Neutrality headed by Francis Jutand, and assisted by the Chairman Benoît Thieulin 
47 European Commission. 2018. Synopsis report of the public consultation on fake news and online 
disinformation. (April 2018). https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/synopsis-report-public-
consultation-fake-news-and-online-disinformation 
48 European Commission.2018.  Digital Single Market .Code of Practice on Disinformation. 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation 
49 Facebook Statistics https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/2018/Q1/Q1-2018-
Earnings-Presentation-%281%29.pdf 
50 Fake news and online disinformation. https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/fake-news-
disinformation 
51 FOW, News and analysis, Top Story. Figure of the Week: 136,000. EU vs Disinfo. 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/figure-of-the-week-136000/ 
52 Gisel Bastidas Guacho, Sara Abdali, Neil Shah, Evangelos E. Papalexakis. 2018. Semi-supervised 
Content-based Detection of Misinformation via Tensor Embeddings (April 2018) 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.09088 
53 Hannah Rashkin, Eunsol Choi et Al. 2017. Truth of varying shades: Analyzing language in fake news 
and political fact-checking, Proceedings of the 2017 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language 
Processing 
54 "Hannah Ritchie. 2016.The biggest fake news stories of 2016. CNBC. 
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/12/30/read-all-about-it-the-biggest-fake-news-stories-of-2016.html 
55 House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee Fifth Report of Session 2017–19 
“Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Interim Report” Published on 29 July 2018 by authority of the House of 
Commons https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/363/363.pdf 
56  https://github.com/several27/FakeNewsCorpus 
57 https://ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/ 
58 Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow. 2017. Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 31, 2 (2017), 211–236. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.31.2.211 
59 Hunt Allcott, Matthew Gentzkow, and Chuan Yu. 2018. Trends in the Diffusion of Misinformation 
on Social Media. (October 2018). https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/fake-news-trends.pdf 
60 IAB Europe. 2018. Value of Digital Advertising. (2018). 
https://www.iabeurope.eu/category/research-thought-leadership/value-of-digital-advertising/ 
61 IAB Europe. 2018.AdEx Benchmark 2017 (digital ad spend in Europe. (2018). 
https://www.iabeurope.eu/research-thought-leadership/iab-europe-report-adex-benchmark-2017-
digital-ad-spend-in-europe/ 
62 IFCN CODE OF PRINCIPLES REPORT 2018 
/https://ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/storage/docs/PUBLIC_VERSION-
CODE_OF_PRINCIPLES_REPORT_YEAR_1_REV_AM.pdf?v=1538242914 
76 
 
63 Jack Marshall. 2018. What is programmatic advertising? (November 2018). 
https://digiday.com/media/what-is-programmatic-advertising/ 
64 James Pamment, Howard Nothhaft, Henrik Agardh-Twetman, Alicia Fjällhed Countering 
Information Influence Activities: The State of the Art, version 1.4 (1 July 2018) .Lund University 
65 "Jana Valant EPRS. 2015. Online consumer reviews The case of misleading or fake reviews. 
European Parliamentary Research Service. 
https://www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/resources/docs/online-consumer-reviews---the-case-of-
misleading-or-fake-reviews.pdf 
66 Jason Schwartz. 2018. Trump’s ‘Fake News Awards’ could violate ethics rules. Politico. 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/15/trump-fake-news-awards-ethics-339183 
67 Jean-Claude Juncker. 2017. Letter to Commissioner for the Digital Economy and Society. 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/sites/cwt/files/commissioner_mission_letters/mission-
letter-mariya-gabriel.pdf 
68 Jennifer Slegg. 2017. Updated Google Quality Rater Guidelines: Fake News, Dubious Claims & 
Clickbait Targeted, The SEM Post (March 2017) http://www.thesempost.com/updated-google-quality-
rater-guidelines-fake-news-clickbait-
targeted/#DistractingDistruptiveMisleading_Titles_Ads_and_Supplementary_Content 
69 Jennifer Slegg. 2018.Google Search Quality Rater Guidelines Updated: Beneficial Purpose, Creator 
Reputation & More.The SEM Post (July 2018) http://www.thesempost.com/google-search-quality-rater-
guidelines-updated/ 
70 Joanna Plucinska. 2018. EU tries to shield 2019 election from fake news. (April 2018). 
https://www.politico.eu/article/fake-news-eu-parliament-election-commission-gathers-national-election-
officials-as-ballot-fears-rise/ 
71 John Lincoln. 2017. Why Programmatic Advertising Is The Hottest New Digital Marketing Trend. 
(June 2017). https://www.inc.com/john-lincoln/why-programmatic-advertising-is-the-hottest-new-digital-
marketing-trend.html 
72 Joint Press Statement. THE SOUNDING BOARD OF THE FORUM ON DISINFORMATION. 
https://www.euractiv.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/09/Joint-Press-Statement-Sounding-Board-
Issues-Opinion-on-Code-of-Practice-EMBARGO.pdf 
73 Jon Henley. 2018. Global crackdown on fake news raises censorship concerns. (April 2018). 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/apr/24/global-crackdown-on-fake-news-raises-censorship-
concerns 
74 Jonah Engel Bromwich and Matthew Haag. 2018. Facebook Is Changing. What Does That Mean for 
Your News Feed? (January 2018). https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/12/technology/facebook-news-
feed-changes.html 
75 Kai Shuy, Amy Slivaz, Suhang Wangy, Jiliang Tang and Huan Liuy.  2017. Fake News Detection on 
Social Media: A Data Mining Perspective,  Computer Science & Engineering, Arizona State University 
76 Katerina Eva Matsa and Elisa Shearer. 2018. News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2018. 
(September 2018). http://www.journalism.org/2018/09/10/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-
2018/ 
77 
 
77 Kathleen Chaykowski. 2018. Facebook's Latest Algorithm Change: Here Are The News Sites That 
Stand To Lose The Most. (March 2018). 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kathleenchaykowski/2018/03/06/facebooks-latest-algorithm-change-
here-are-the-news-sites-that-stand-to-lose-the-most/#57a846a134ec 
78 Katie Forster. 2017. Revealed: How dangerous fake health news conquered Facebook. 
Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/fake-news-
health-facebook-cruel-damaging-social-media-mike-adams-natural-health-ranger-conspiracy-
a7498201.html 
79 Kaye, David. “Freedom of Expression Monitors Issue Joint Declaration on ‘Fake News’, 
Disinformation and Propaganda.” OHCHR | Freedom of Religion: UN Expert Hails Albania, but Notes New 
Challenges and Unresolved Issues from the Past, Mar. 2017, 
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21287&LangID=E. 
80 Kyle Gordon. 2018. Topic: Daily time spent on social networking by internet users worldwide from 
2012 to 2017 (in minutes) (2018). https://www.statista.com/statistics/433871/daily-social-media-usage-
worldwide/ 
81 Kyle Gordon. 2018. Topic: Digital Advertising in the United States. (2018). 
https://www.statista.com/outlook/216/109/digital-advertising/united-states 
82 Kyle Gordon. 2018. Topic: Mobile social media Statistics &Facts. (2018). 
https://www.statista.com/topics/2478/mobile-social-networks/ 
83 Lee Howell. 2013. World Economic Forum – Global Risks 2013 Eighth Edition. (2013). Retrieved 
December 7, 2018 from http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2013/ 
84 Leonid Bershidsky. 2018. Fake News Takes Its Toll on Sweden’s Elections. Bloomberg. 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-15/fake-news-roiled-sweden-s-elections-but-it-
was-homegrown 
85 Linda Keslar. 2018. The Rise of Fake Medical News. ProtoMag. Massachusetts General Hospital. 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369118X.2018.1474241 
86 Luc Steinberg. 2017 Beyond Fake News – 10 Types of Misleading News. Article, Conspiracy 
Theories, Fake News, Infographic, Media Literacy for citizenship. https://eavi.eu/beyond-fake-news-10-
types-misleading-info/ 
87 Maria Minsker. 2017. Advertisers Want Programmatic Tech Players to Fight Fake News. Emarketer. 
https://www.emarketer.com/Article/Advertisers-Want-Programmatic-Tech-Players-Fight-Fake-
News/1016406 
88 Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook post / https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10103269806149061 
89 Martin Potthast, Johannes Kiesel, Kevin Reinartz, Janek Bevendor_, and Benno Stein. A stylometric 
inquiry into hyperpartisan and fake news. arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.05638, 2017. 
90 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.IT) Internet Policy Research Initiative (IPRI). 2017. 
Dealing with fake news policies and technicalmeasures. (2017). https://internetpolicy.mit.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/Fake-news-recommendations-Wajeeha-MITs-IPRI.pdf 
91 Mathew Ingram. 2017. Google and Facebook Account For Nearly All Growth in Digital Ads. (April 
2017). http://fortune.com/2017/04/26/google-facebook-digital-ads/ 
78 
 
92  Matt Flegenheimer and Michael M. Grynbaum. 2018. Trump Hands Out ‘Fake News Awards,’ Sans 
the Red Carpet. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/17/business/media/fake-news-
awards.html 
93 Mike Isaac and Kevin Roose. 2018. Disinformation and fake news spreads over WhatApp ahead of 
Brazil's presidential election. Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/brazil-
election-2018-whatsap-fake-news-presidential-disinformation-a8593741.html 
94 Mike Wendling. 2018. The (almost) complete history of 'fake news'. (January 2018). Retrieved 
December 7, 2018 from https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-42724320 
95 Miriam J. Metzger, Andrew J. Flanagin, and Ryan B. Medders. 2010. Social and Heuristic 
Approaches to Credibility Evaluation Online. Journal of Communication 60, 3 (2010), 413–439. 
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2010.01488.x 
96 Mostafa El-Bermawy. 2016. Your filter bubble is destroying democracy. (November 2016). 
Retrieved November 7, 2018 from https://www.wired.com/author/mostafa-m-el-bermawy/ 
97 Müller, Karsten and Schwarz, Carlo, Fanning the Flames of Hate: Social Media and Hate Crime 
(November 30, 2018). Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3082972 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3082972 
98  Müller, Karsten and Schwarz, Carlo, Making America Hate Again? Twitter and Hate Crime Under 
Trump (March 30, 2018). Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3149103 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3149103 
99 News Media Association.  2017. NMA Calls For Investigation Into Google, Facebook and the Digital 
Advertising Supply Chain to Combat Fake News . http://www.newsmediauk.org/Latest/nma-calls-for-
investigation-into-google-facebook-and-the-digital-advertising-supply-chain-to-combat-fake-news 
100 Nic Newman, Richard Fletcher, and Antonis Kalogeropoulos. 2018. Digital News Report 2018. 
(2018). http://media.digitalnewsreport.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/digital-news-report-
2018.pdf?x89475 
101 Nicola Watts. 2018. 5 Types of 'Fake News' and Why They Matter. Asian Enterprise Institute 
https://web.smu.edu.sg/spring/5-types-of-fake-news-and-why-they-matter/  
102 Oded Yaron. 2018. How Fake News Is Threatening the Upcoming Elections in Israel. Haaretz. 
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-the-online-dangers-threatening-fair-
elections-in-israel-1.6455522 
103 Philipp Schindler. 2018. The Google News Initiative: Building a stronger future for news. Google 
Blog (March 2018) https://www.blog.google/outreach-initiatives/google-news-initiative/announcing-
google-news-initiative/ 
104  Policy Institute at King’s and Ipsos MORI. 2018. Brexit misperceptions. 
https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/policy-institute/publications/Brexit-misperceptions.pdf 
105 Przemyslaw M. Waszak, Wioleta Kasprzycka-Waszak, Alicja Kubanek. 2018.  The spread of medical 
fake news in social media – The pilot quantitative study, Health Policy and Technology, Volume 7, Issue 2, 
2018, Pages 115-118, ISSN 2211-8837, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hlpt.2018.03.002. 
106 PWC. 2018. Internet Advertising Revenue Report. (2018). https://www.iab.com/insights/iab-
internet-advertising-revenue-report-conducted-by-pricewaterhousecoopers-pwc-2/ 
79 
 
107 Rani Molla. 2018. Google is replacing Facebook's traffic to publishers. (February 2018). 
https://www.recode.net/2018/2/15/17013618/google-facebook-traffic-publishers-amp-chartbeat 
108 Rebecca Appleton, 2017, Updated Google Quality Rater Guidelines target fake news, low quality 
and clickbait, Wordtracker, https://www.wordtracker.com/blog/search-news/updated-google-search-
quality-guidelines-focus-on-fake-news-poor-quality-and-clickbait 
109 Richard Fletcher, Alessio Cornia et al.2018, Measuring the reach of “fake news” and online 
disinformation in Europe. Reuters Institute. 
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2018-
02/Measuring%20the%20reach%20of%20fake%20news%20and%20online%20distribution%20in%20Euro
pe%20CORRECT%20FLAG.pdf 
110 S. B. Parikh and P. K. Atrey, "Media-Rich Fake News Detection: A Survey," 2018 IEEE Conference 
on Multimedia Information Processing and Retrieval (MIPR), Miami, FL, 2018, pp. 436-441.doi: 
10.1109/MIPR.2018.00093 
111 Sam Shead. 2017. Google is touting 4Chan threads which incorrectly name the Las Vegas shooter. 
Business Insider. October 2017. https://www.businessinsider.com/google-is-touting-4chan-threads-when-
people-search-las-vegas-shooter-2017-10 
112 Savvas Zannettou, Michael Sirivianos et Al. 2018 The Web of False Information- Rumors, Fake 
News, Hoaxes, Clickbait, and Various Other Shenanigans (2018) https://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.03461.pdf 
113 Sir Tim Burners Lee. 2017. Three challenges for the web, according to its inventor. (March 2017). 
Retrieved December 7, 2018 from https://webfoundation.org/2017/03/web-turns-28-letter/ 
114 Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral. 2018. The spread of true and false news online. Science 
359, 6380 (2018), 1146–1151. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.aap9559 
115 SOUNDING BOARD OF FORUM ON DISINFORMATION ONLINE ISSUES UNANIMOUS OPINION ON 
SO-CALLED CODE OF PRACTICE September 2018. https://www.ebu.ch/contents/news/2018/09/sounding-
board-of-forum-on-disinformation-online-issues-unanimous-opinion-on-so-called-code-of-practice.html 
116 Srijan Kumar and Neil Shah. 2018. False Information on Web and Social Media: A Survey. 1, 1 (April 
2018), 35 pages.https://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.08559.pdf 
117 Stanford University. 2016. Stanford researchers find students have trouble judging the credibility 
of information online. (December 2016). https://ed.stanford.edu/news/stanford-researchers-find-
students-have-trouble-judging-credibility-information-online 
118 Statement by Vice-President Ansip at the European Parliament, Strasbourg in the plenary debate: 
"Hate speech, populism and fake news on social media – towards an EU response" 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/ansip/announcements/statement-vice-
president-ansip-european-parliament-strasbourg-plenary-debate-hate-speech-populism_en 
119 Tambini, D. (2017). Fake News: Public Policy Responses. Media Policy Brief 20. London: Media 
Policy Project, London School of Economics and Political Science. 
120 Tessa Lyons. 2018. Increasing Our Efforts to Fight False News. Facebook Newsroom.June 2018. 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/06/increasing-our-efforts-to-fight-false-news/ 
121 The code and the platforms ,IFCN Code of Principles /  
https://ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/know-more/the-code-and-the-platforms 
80 
 
122 The reality of fake news in Kenya. Portland Communications. https://portland-
communications.com/pdf/The-Reality-of-Fake-News-in-Kenya.pdf 
123 TNS Political & Social at the request of the European Commission. 2018.  Directorate-General for 
Communications NetworksFake news and disinformation online, Flash Eurobarometer 464 (April 2018) 
124 Victoria L. Rubin, Yimin Chen and Niall J. Conroy (2015) Deception Detection for news: Three types 
of fakes. 
125 Vindu Goel, Suhasini Raj and Priyadarshini Ravichandran. 2018. How WhatsApp Leads Mobs to 
Murder in India. The New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/07/18/technology/whatsapp-india-killings.html 
126 Warren A Peterson and Noel P Gist. Rumor and public opinion. In American Journal of Sociology, 
1951. 
127 "World Wide Web Foundation. 2018. THE INVISIBLE CURATION OF CONTENT: Facebook’s News 
Feed and our Information Diets. 
http://webfoundation.org/docs/2018/04/WF_InvisibleCurationContent_Screen_AW.pdf" 
128 Yasmeen Serhan. 2018. Italy Scrambles to Fight Misinformation Ahead of Its Elections. The Atlantic. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/europe-fake-news/551972/ 
129 Yomi Kazeem. 2018. Nigerian media houses are forming a coalition to combat fake news ahead of 
next year’s elections. Quartz Africa. https://qz.com/africa/1478737/fake-news-media-collaborate-ahead-
of-nigeria-2019-election/ 
130 Yuhas, Alan. “Facebook Announces New Push against Fake News after Obama Comments.” The 
Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 19 Nov. 2016, 
www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/19/facebook-fake-news-mark-zuckerberg. 
131 Ziga Turk. 2018. Technology as Enabler of Fake News and a Potential Tool to Combat It . Policy 
Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies  University of Ljubljana, SloveniaDirectorate-
General for Internal Policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Glossary 
 TYPE DEFINITION 
1 Fabricated Stories that completely lack of any factual base, 100% false. The intention is to deceive and cause harm 
[19]. One of the most severe type [88] as fabrication adopts the style of news articles so the recipients 
believe it is legitimate [38]. Could be text but also in visual format [80] 
2 Imposter Genuine sources that are impersonated with false, made-up sources to support basically a false 
narrative. It is actually very misleading since source/author are considered great criteria of verifying 
credibility [112,55,19]. [use of journalists name / logo / branding of mimic urls]  
3 Conspiracy theories  Stories without factual base as there is no established baseline for truth. They usually explain 
important events as secret plots by government or powerful individuals [112]. Conspiracies are by 
definition, difficult to verify as true or false, and they are typically originated by people who believe 
them to be true [58]. Evidences that refutes the conspiracy is regarded as further proof of the 
conspiracy [86]. Some conspiracy theories may have damaging ripple-effects. 
  
4 Hoaxes Relatively complex and large‐scale fabrications which may include deceptions that go beyond the 
scope of fun or scam and cause material loss or harm to the victim [124].  They contain facts that are 
either false or inaccurate and are presented as legitimate facts. This category is also known in the 
research community either as half-truth or factoid stories [112] able to convince readers of the validity 
of a paranoia-fueled story [53]. 
  
5 Hyperpartisan Stories that are extremely biased towards a person/party/situation/ event driving division and 
polarization. The context of this type of news information is extremely one-sided [i.e. left or right 
wing], inflammatory, emotional and often riddled with untruths. They contain either a mixture of true 
and false or mostly false thus misleading information designed to confirm a particular ideological view 
[112,89 ]. 
6 Rumors Refers to stories whose truthfulness is ambiguous or never confirmed [gossip, innuendo, unverified 
claims]. This kind of false information is widely propagated on OSNs [126]. 
7 Clickbait Sources that provide generally credible content but use exaggerated [56] deliberate use of misleading 
and unverified headlines and thumbnails of content on the Web with the goal of increasing their traffic 
for profit or popularity [88]. Once the reader is there, the content rarely satisfies their interest [86].   
8 Misleading 
connection 
This term was created by integrating the types of false connection, false context and misleading 
content. It means the misleading use of information to frame an issue or individual. When headlines, 
visuals or captions do not support the content. Separate parts of source information may be factual 
but are presented using wrong connection [context /content]. [19,55,101] 
9 Fake reviews Any [positive, neutral or negative] review that is not an actual consumer's honest and impartial opinion 
or that does not reflect a consumer's genuine experience of a product, service or business [65].  
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10 Trolling The act of deliberately posting offensive or inflammatory content to an online community with the 
intent of provoking readers or disrupting conversation. Today, the term “troll” is most often used to 
refer to any person harassing or insulting others online [101].  
11 Pseudoscience Information that misrepresents real scientific studies with dubious or false claims. Often contradicts 
experts [44]. Promotes pseudoscience, metaphysics, naturalistic fallacies and other [102].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
